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3Abstract
This paper examines the effect of the new labor law of 2003, which 
provides flexibility in the hiring and firing procedures since labor market 
inflexibility was seen as one of the obstacles to job creation in Egypt. The 
analysis focuses on the effect of the new law on formal employment (jobs 
with contracts) in the private non-agricultural regular waged sector. The 
findings suggest that the new law has had a positive impact on those who 
were employed in 1998 in the private non-agricultural sector and in the pri-
vate non-agricultural waged sector. However, the effect was not significant 
for new entrants to the labor market looking for first jobs. 
1. Introduction
Egypt has undergone a number of economic reform measures since the 
early 1990s, with the aim of liberalizing the economy and moving toward a 
market economy. As a result, among other measures, the Egyptian govern-
ment has introduced a new labor law (No. 12) with the goal of increasing 
flexibility in the labor market. Law 12, which came in effect in July 2003, 
provides comprehensive guidelines for the recruitment, hiring, compen-
sation, and termination of employees. In particular, it provides increased 
flexibility for firms in the hiring/firing process, which has been a major 
bottleneck for job creation in the Egyptian labor market.
The introduction of the new labor law in Egypt provides us with an 
opportunity to study the impact of regulations that aim to provide more 
flexibility in the labor market. Indeed, there is a wide disagreement among 
economists on the benefits of labor market regulations and on the impact 
of labor market flexibility on employment in particular. Some economists 
believe that unregulated labor markets are superior to regulated ones. On the 
other hand, others argue that regulations are needed to protect poor and vul-
nerable workers.1 Given the change in the law, this paper examines the effect 
of introducing more flexible employment protection legislation in Egypt.
This paper will explore the following issues: What is the effect of the 
new labor law on informalization? Does the introduction of more flexible 
1  See Freeman (1993) for a summary of this debate.
4labor codes that facilitate the hiring/firing process lead to an increase in 
formal employment? This is an important issue for developing countries, 
like Egypt, where the informal sector has been growing recently and has 
become the main employer in the economy. Yet informal employment 
tends to be of low quality with no job security and no social security cover-
age. From a policy perspective, it is essential to investigate whether a more 
flexible labor market would encourage the growth of the private formal 
sector leading to more protected jobs.
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 will review the 
previous literature dealing with labor market regulations and focus on the 
effect of employment protection regulations. Section 3 will discuss Egypt’s 
Labor Law no. 12 and its aims. Section 4 will examine what has happened 
to informalization in Egypt in general and then whether the new labor 
law has had any impact on informal employment. Section 5 will go beyond 
descriptive analysis to test for the impact of the new labor law for different 
groups of workers. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The functioning of labor markets depends on institutions and regu-
lations. For example, labor market regulations can affect the rate of job 
creation and destruction, the levels of employment and unemployment 
in the economy, and the degree of social protection provided to workers. 
However, there is wide disagreement among economists on the benefits of 
labor market regulations. Some economists believe that unregulated labor 
markets are superior to regulated ones; i.e. more efficient. They argue that 
labor market regulations introduce distortions that misallocate labor; waste 
resources through rent seeking, impede adjustments to economic shocks, 
discourage hiring, and favor “insiders” (such as regular workers, or males) 
and therefore reduce growth. Freeman (1993) refers to that view as the “dis-
tortionist.” On the other hand, some believe that due to market failure and 
the ensuing injustice and inequity, regulations are needed to protect poor 
and vulnerable workers. This is referred to as the “institutionalist” view.2
There are various forms of labor regulations. In general, labor market 
regulations are introduced with the objective of protecting workers from 
2  See Freeman (1993) for a summary of this debate.
5uninsurable labor market risk, such as employment risk, or from earnings risk. 
To improve the earnings of the most disadvantaged categories of workers, 
governments typically set minimum wages; they might also mandate that 
employers provide non-wage benefits to their workers, such as healthcare, 
paid vacations, maternity leave, etc. To protect workers from employment 
risk, governments can decide to protect existing jobs by restricting the 
ability of firms to lay off employees at will and/or provide unemployment 
insurance to those who lose their job. (Boeri et al. 2008)
In this paper, the focus is on one particular set of labor market regula-
tions namely employment protection, or job security, rules that refer to 
hiring and firing arrangements. These can cover what kinds of contracts 
are allowed, the conditions under which workers can be terminated, 
requirements for severance and advance notice of termination, redun-
dancy procedures, and special rules for mass layoffs. 
The degree to which employment protection rules are rigid or flex-
ible can affect labor market outcomes including employment levels, labor 
dynamics (i.e. employment fluctuations), and the composition of employ-
ment. Rigid employment rules are expected to lengthen job tenure and 
reduce labor turnover, protecting the jobs of incumbent employees and lim-
iting hiring opportunities. At the same time, rigid job security rules affect 
the composition of employment by shifting labor to uncovered (informal) 
sectors or employment types. Obviously, the effectiveness of labor regula-
tion will depend on the extent to which those regulations are enforced. 
Betcherman et al (2001) summarize the theoretical impact of strict 
termination rules as follows: lower labor turnover rates (hirings plus 
separations);   lower aggregate employment levels; greater numbers of 
long-tenure jobs; lower labor force participation rates; no clear impact on 
unemployment levels, but longer average unemployment durations; at a 
macro level, slower recovery from an aggregate shock; more self-employ-
ment as a share of total employment; more non-standard employment 
(e.g., part-time or temporary); positive employment effects for skilled 
prime-age males but lower employment for women, young people, and 
less-skilled workers. They add that the empirical findings are strongest for 
the dynamic effects—on turnover and tenure and flows between employ-
ment and unemployment and in terms of who benefits from employment 
protection rules and who does not. For example, in Latin America there is 
evidence of negative employment effects of job security rules. 
In the last two decades or so, there has been a move toward labor mar-
ket flexibility and many countries introduced labor market reforms to 
6enhance productivity, competition, and to accelerate employment genera-
tion and improve economic performance. Yet the empirical evidence on 
the effects of labor flexibility is mixed.
The main empirical evidence on the effect of labor market flexibility has 
focused mainly on developed countries but have more recently included 
studies on less-developed countries (LDCs). The focus of the studies on 
DCs has been on whether excessively strict employment protection law 
has been an important contributor to the persistently high unemploy-
ment experienced in many countries that are part of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, the empir-
ical research has not provided a clear-cut answer. Early on, Lazear (1990), 
using data on severance pay and periods of notice required before employ-
ment termination for 22 developed countries for the period 1956–84, found 
some evidence that they have a negative relationship with the employment 
rate and a positive one with the unemployment rate. 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005), using a new data set on hiring and fir-
ing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the period 1984–90 based on 
surveys of business people in the countries covered, controlling for coun-
try and time fixed effects, and adopting dynamic panel data techniques, 
found evidence that increasing the flexibility of the labor market increases 
both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force. 
There is also some evidence that more flexibility leads to lower unemploy-
ment rates and to lower rates of long-term unemployment. They also found 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inflexible labor markets pro-
duce “jobless recoveries” and introduce more unemployment persistence.
As argued by Boeri et al. (2008), developing countries are often funda-
mentally different from developed economies. Poorer countries tend to 
have stricter labor regulations compared to richer countries, even though 
they offer less social protection. At the same time, rigid labor regulation is 
associated with a larger informal sector that is associated with worse work-
ing conditions and poor job “quality” (Boeri et al. [2008]). Developing 
countries are often characterized by weak law enforcement, a large infor-
mal sector, underdeveloped capital markets, and informal credit and 
insurance networks. Ignoring these features when studying developing 
economies can be problematic. 
According to the World Bank in Doing Business 2009, developing coun-
tries tend to mistakenly go to the extreme of rigid regulations, pushing 
employers and workers into the informal sector. Overly rigid regulations 
may have undesirable effects such as less job creation, smaller company 
7size, less investment in research and development, and longer spells of 
unemployment and thus the obsolescence of skills, all of which may reduce 
productivity growth. Hence excessive rigidity can be to the detriment of 
businesses and workers alike.
Recent studies have examined the effect of labor market regulations 
and labor market flexibility in developing countries. For example, Kingdon 
et al. (2006) argue that the failure of African labor markets to create good 
paying jobs was the result of lack of labor market “flexibility” keeping for-
mal sector wages above their equilibrium level and restricting job creation. 
This has resulted in excess labor supply in the form of either open unem-
ployment or a growing self-employment sector. 
Besley and Burgess (2004) examine the link between regulation and 
long-term development in India by looking at state amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. Their empirical evidence suggests that 
labor regulation is a key factor in the pattern of manufacturing develop-
ment in India. Regulating in a pro-worker direction was associated with 
lower levels of investment, employment, productivity and output in regis-
tered manufacturing. It also increased informal sector activity.
Kugler (2004) examines impact of the Colombian labor market reform 
of 1990 which substantially reduced the costs of dismissing workers 
through the reduction of severance payments on unemployment. Using 
micro-level data from Colombia, she finds that those reforms contributed 
to 10% of the reduction in unemployment during the period of study. 
In the next section, the changes in labor regulations in Egypt are 
described first before examining the impact of those employment protec-
tion reforms on informal/formal employment.
3. The New Labor Law
The Egyptian government introduced a new labor law (No.12) in 2003. 
The new law provides comprehensive guidelines for the recruitment, hir-
ing, compensation, and termination of employees. The law comprises 257 
articles that address all the legal aspects regulating the Egyptian labor mar-
ket. The law aims to increase private sector involvement and at the same 
time achieve a balance between employees’ and employers’ rights. 
Among the most important issues that the new law addresses is the right 
of an employer to fire an employee and the conditions pertaining to this, as 
well as granting employees the right to carry out a peaceful strike according 
8to controls and procedures prescribed in the new law. In particular, the new 
law provides increased flexibility for firms in the hiring/firing process, which 
has been a major bottleneck for job creation in the Egyptian labor market. 
The new labor law allows private sector employers to renew a tem-
porary contract without transforming it automatically into a permanent 
employment status as was stated in the preceding law. Also, under the new 
regulation, employers can terminate a contract more easily and lay offs can 
be justified by difficult economic conditions. In return, workers that have 
been dismissed have the right to appeal. However, this law does not apply 
to public servants of state agencies, including local government units and 
public authorities, nor to self-employed workers. 
Until July 2003, when the new labor law was enforced, existing legis-
lation had been rather stringent both for workers and for employers. It 
prohibited employers from terminating the contract of a worker after a 
probation period. In addition, employers were not allowed to recruit work-
ers directly but through local employment offices.
Thus, given the new labor regulations, it seems important to exam-
ine the effect of the new labor on employment, in particular on informal 
employment. Theoretically, one would expect the new law to enable 
employers to hire and fire workers more easily and hence to enable them 
to hire more workers formally. In the following section we test the hypoth-
esis that the introduction of the new labor law has led to more formal 
private employment. 
4. What Has Happened to Informalization?
4.1 Data
The analysis in this paper will be based on Egypt Labor Market 
Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS06) which is a follow-up survey to Egypt 
Labor Market Survey of 1998 (ELMS98). Both surveys carried out by 
the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with the Egyptian 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)—the 
main statistical agency of the Egyptian government. The ELMPS06 is the 
second round of what is intended to be a periodic longitudinal survey that 
tracks the labor market and demographic characteristics of the house-
holds and individuals interviewed in 1998, any new households that might 
have formed as a result of splits from the original households, as well as 
9a refresher sample of households to ensure that the data continue to be 
nationally representative.
The fieldwork for ELMPS06 was carried out from January to March 
2006. The final sample of 8,349 households is made up of 3,684 households 
from the original ELMS98 survey, 2,167 new households that emerged 
from these households as a result of splits, and a refresher sample of 2,498 
households. Of the 23,997 individuals interviewed in 1998, 17,357 (72%) were 
successfully re-interviewed in 2006, forming a panel that is used for our 
analysis. The attrition that occurred in the original 1998 sample was mostly 
random in nature since it resulted from the loss of records containing 
identifying information for the 1998 households at CAPMAS. Of the 1,115 
households that could not be re-interviewed, 615 are due to loss of records 
and the remainder is made up of expected losses due to total relocation of 
the household, death of all household members, or refusal to participate in 
the survey.3 The questionnaire for the ELMPS06 is closely based on that 
used in the ELMS98 to ensure comparability of the data over time.  
The surveys provide a rich source of information on labor market condi-
tions of individuals. The surveys collect information on the characteristics 
of jobs such as on the presence of legal job contract and social security cov-
erage. The paper will make use of the panel nature of ELMPS06 and of 
data on the characteristics of first jobs, as well as of the rich retrospective 
information on previous employment characteristics.
4.2 Informality Patterns and Trends
First, examining informality trends between 1998 and 2006 provides an 
interesting picture (Fig. 1). Looking at informality defined as lack of job 
contract and lack of social security suggests that informality has increased 
between 1998 and 2006 as a share of total employment and as a share of 
non-agriculture employment. However, limiting the scope to private non-
agriculture waged employment the share of informality has declined over 
this period. 
Measuring informality as lack of job contract only also provides a similar 
pattern. In 2006, 69% of private non-agricultural regular waged workers 
had no job contracts, down from 74% in 1998, thus suggesting that the 
decline in informality among private non-agriculture employment is due 
3 For more details, see Barsoum (2006). 
10
to more workers holding job contracts and not to do with social security, 
which is what one would expect if the new labor law has had an impact. 
Figure 1: Proportion of Informal Employment
Public sector employees tend to be protected: they hold job contracts 
and have social security coverage, in addition to other benefits. The agri-
cultural sector is typically excluded from the informal sector since it has 
its own features: subsistence, family work, etc. Thus, the sector that is of 
interest to us is the private non-agricultural sector. Examining the compo-
sition of the non-agricultural informal employment, the evidence suggests 
a change between 1998 and 2006. As Figure 2 shows, the proportion of 
regular waged workers has increased by almost 15 percentage points and 
amounted to almost 60% in 2006. At the same time, the share of casual 
waged workers has also declined. Meanwhile the share of unpaid family 
workers also fell over this time period. This suggests that informal employ-
ment is increasingly becoming dominated by regular waged work and not 
self-employment or employers. 
11
Figure 2: Composition of Informal (No Contract & No Social Security): Non-Agricultural 
Employment by Work Status
Given that the change in the labor law applies only to the private (non-
agricultural) sector and that only waged workers may hold contracts (i.e. 
self-employed workers and employers do not hold job contracts), the 
focus of this paper will be on private non-agricultural regular waged work. 
Regular work includes both permanent and temporary, but excludes sea-
sonal and intermittent. The aim of the paper is to test whether the new 
labor law affected the proportion of job contract holders among the pri-
vate non-agricultural regular waged workers (PNARW) in 2006. For the 
rest of the paper, informality refers to lack of job contract while formality 
refers to holding a job contract.
An important issue is whether the increase in job contract holders 
increased as a result of the law. Figure 3 shows the proportion of jobs with 
contracts that started between 1998 and 2006. There is no evidence that 
the new labor law has had an effect on the proportion of jobs with con-
tracts in PNARW (Fig. 3). However, limiting the analysis to those who 
were private non-agricultural regular waged workers in 1998 (PNARW98; 
Fig. 4a), the fitted trend line shows a positive trend suggesting that there 
has been an increase in formality (job contract holding) between 1998 and 
2006 among PNARW workers. A similar pattern emerges if the analysis 
is confined to those who were in private non-agricultural employment 
(waged and non-waged) in 1998—Fig. 4b. This indicates that among those 
were already employed in private non-agricultural sector there is evidence 
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that the labor law has had a positive impact on the likelihood of holding 
job contract in 2006. At the same time this suggests that the new entrants 
might be the ones who were not affected by the new labor law, an issue we 
investigate further below.
Figure 3: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
Figure 4a: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
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Figure 4b: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
Over the last three decades, new entrants to the labor market have 
become increasingly likely to start their careers in the informal sector. 
Moktar and Wahba (2000) have found that in the early 1970s, 20% of 
workers used to start their working life with informal jobs, but by 1998, 
69% of new workers have started in informal employment. Figure 5 shows 
the proportion of first jobs without contracts between 1975 and 2005. 
There has been an increase in the trend of first jobs of those aged 18–45 
years of age being not protected by contracts over the whole period. This 
might explain why in Fig. 3, when we examine all jobs that started between 
1998 and 2006, we don’t find a positive trend since new entrants (first jobs) 
are included. 
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Figure 5: Proportion of First Jobs without Contract
4.3 Transition to PNARW Jobs with Contracts
Next we examine the rate of transition for different types of work-
ers between 1998 and 2006 and limit the analysis to those who were aged 
20–50 years old in 1998. As seen in Table 1, around 8% of workers who were 
engaged in informal private non-agricultural employment (PNA) have 
become formal private non-agricultural regular waged (PNARW) workers 
in 2006. Also, 7% of workers who were informal PNAW in 1998 became 
formal PNARW by 2006. Finally among those who were notPNAW in 
1998, 4% acquired job contracts by 2006. This last group (notPNAW) 
includes those where not working in 1998, such as students and house-
wives, non-waged workers, agricultural workers, and public sector workers 
in 1998, but who were working in 2006. 
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Table 1: Transition Matrices
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006





Job Contract 1998 93.99 6.01 100 (33.21)
No Job Contract 1998 8.14 91.86 100 (66.79)
Total 36.66 63.34 100 (100)
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006
Job Contract 2006 No Job Contract 2006 Total
Private Non-
Agriculture Waged 
Work (PNAW) in 1998
Job Contract 1998 93.99 6.01 100 (34.43)
No Job Contract 1998 7.35 92.65 100 (65.57)
Total 37.18 62.82 100 (100)
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006
Job Contract 2006 No Job Contract 2006 Total
Not Private Non-
Agriculture Waged 
Work (notPNAW) in 
1998
Job Contract 1998 97.88 2.12 100 (53.02)
No Job Contract 1998 4.22 95.78 100 (46.98)
Total 53.88 46.12 100 (100)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the column sum in percent.
Table A1 provides the transition rate to formal PNARW before and 
after 2003, the year the law was introduced. Almost 34% of movers between 
informal PNAW98 and formal PNARW06 moved between 2003–05. 
However, 5% of the moves between 1998–2002 were moves from PNAW98 
to PNARW06 compared to 29% between 2003–05 as illustrated in Fig. 6. 
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Similar patterns are observed for moves between PNA98–PNARW06 
and notPNAW98–PNARW06 suggesting that the proportion of moves 
to PNARW was higher between 2003–05 than between 1998–2002, sup-
porting the hypothesis that the new labor law has had a positive impact 
on formal employment among employed workers. However, there doesn’t 
seem to be an impact for first jobs. 
Figure 6: Proportion of Job Moves Before & After 2003: By Time Period
A striking, yet unsurprising, aspect of the characteristics of informal 
workers in 1998 that became formal by 2006, i.e. movers, is that they are pre-
dominantly male. The transition rates for females to PNARW in 2006 are 
very low at around 2% if they were employed in 1998 and less than 1% for 
those who were notPNAW workers in 1998 (Fig. 7). The fundamental prob-
lem is that very few women are employed, as a proportion of working women, 
in the private non-agricultural waged sector. This has been highlighted in 
previous studies; see for example Wahba (2009) and Assaad (2007). 
Another important dimension of transition to formal PNARW in 2006 
is education. Those with university degrees who were employed in 1998 
with no contract had 16% probability of holding a contract in 2006 com-
pared to around 3% among the illiterates (Fig. 8). There is clear evidence 
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that education affects the transition rates from informal jobs to formal 
ones. This is consistent with Wahba (2009) who, using evidence from the 
ELMPS06, and controlling for selectivity into informal jobs, finds that 
the mobility from informal to semi-formal/formal employment is highly 
segmented along education and gender. She concludes that informal 
employment is a stepping stone for highly educated male workers, but is a 
dead end for the uneducated, and for female workers.
Figure 7: Transitional Rates by Gender
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Figure 8: Transitional Rates by Educational Levels
Characteristics of Movers
Table 2 presents the characteristics of movers distinguished by their orig-
inal type of employment in 1998. We study three types of workers as before 
who ended up in formal PNARW jobs in 2006. First, gender clearly plays 
an important role with the great majority of movers being males. Movers 
tend to be around two years younger on average to non-movers, although 
movers from notPNAW98 tend to be much younger than non-movers. As 
seen above, but here looking at the educational distribution of movers and 
non-movers, it is clear that movers on the whole are more educated than 
non-movers. Almost 58% of movers from PNAW98 or PNA98 have at least 
intermediate degrees. This is even more intensified among movers from not-
PNAW98 were 57% have university degrees. There is also some indication 
that the distribution of movers is not even across regions. Looking at the 
region of employment in 1998, more workers move in Alexandria and the 
canal cities and fewer in Lower (urban and rural) Egypt. Movers also tend 
to have about 5 years shorter job tenures than non-movers. Examining the 
occupations in 1998 shows that professionals are the most likely to move, 
which is not surprising given that professionals tend be on average better 
educated. However, it has to be noted that this is not reflected for those 
who were notPNAW98. One has to be cautious in interpreting too much 
into that given that this category includes those who were not working and 
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therefore will not have a profession in 1998. Finally, family background does 
matter: movers tend to have on average better educated fathers, reflected 
in fewer movers having illiterate fathers. Moreover, more movers tend to 
have fathers who were white collar workers than non-movers.
Table 2: Movers to Formal PNARW Jobs: 1998–2006
PNA98 & PNARW06 PNAW98 & PNARW06 notPNAW98 & 
PNARW06
Variable Movers All Movers All Movers All
Individual Characteristics
Male (%) 98.04 94.46 98.28 94.62 80.49 57.48
Age (in 1998)
Age in years 26.8 28.9 27.3 29.0 24.8 33.6
20–29 old % 78.43 61.93 75.86 61.91 86.18 36.92
30–39 old % 19.61 26.14 18.97 26.11 8.13 34.04
40–49 old % 1.96 10.65 5.17 10.77 5.69 27.23
Education %
None 7.84 22.73 6.90 22.48 1.63 31.65
Reads & writes 7.84 11.93 8.62 11.84 2.44 6.37
Less then 
intermediate
17.65 26.56 17.24 26.24 7.32 11.14
Intermediate 49.02 29.12 50.00 30.01 22.76 26.01
Higher than 
intermediate
3.92 3.84 5.17 3.90 8.13 4.83
University 13.73 5.82 12.07 5.52 57.72 20.01
Job Characteristics in 1998 
Job Region in 
1998 %
Greater Cairo 19.61 18.32 18.97 18.03 2.44 9.41
Alex.& Canal Cities 23.53 12.36 20.69 11.98 8.13 6.90
Lower Urban 11.76 17.19 10.34 16.69 3.25 11.74
Upper Urban 15.69 11.22 13.79 11.57 5.69 13.87
Lower Rural 5.88 11.79 12.07 12.65 7.32 13.54
Upper Rural 3.92 4.97 3.45 5.25 2.44 13.03
Tenure before 98 
(years)
8.25 13.31 8.91 13.34 4.33 15.15
continued u
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Occupation in 1998, %
Legislators, 
senior officials & 
managers
3.92 0.99 5.17 2.02 1.63 7.69




1.96 2.27 1.72 2.56 2.44 9.90




25.49 20.03 24.14 19.38 2.44 7.46
Skilled agricultural 
& fishery workers
5.88 1.70 6.90 2.56 8.13 16.47
Craft & related 
trades workers
29.41 43.47 29.31 42.80 4.88 6.68
Plant & machine 
operators and 
assemblers
15.69 19.89 17.24 19.25 4.88 2.85
Elementary 
occupations
5.88 6.96 5.17 7.00 1.63 1.49
Father’s characteristics %
Illiterate 33.33 59.09 32.76 59.08 23.58 54.16
White collar 31.37 19.18 32.76 19.52 47.97 25.21
Given the different nature and patterns of first jobs, Table 3 examines 
that group separately. Those are the characteristics of individuals aged 
between 18 and 45 years of age,4 whose first job started between 1998 and 
2006. We also distinguish between all first jobs and PNAW first jobs. 
Comparing the characteristics of those who have had formal PNARW 
first jobs, similar patterns are observed as in Table 2. A couple of interest-
ing differences are: first, those who managed to secure formal PNARW 
first jobs tend to be on average slightly older than those who haven’t, and 
37% of them tend to be located in Greater Cairo.
4  This age bracket seems to be reasonable to consider for first jobs. Including 15–18 years old distorts 
the results since those are least likely to have a formal job. Several sensitivity analyses were conducted 
using 20–45 and 18–40 age brackets and the results were robust.
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Table 3: Formal PNARW First Jobs in 2006
All First Jobs PNAW First Jobs Formal
PNARW06
% Jobs Started 2003–05 38.49 37.35 36.80
Individual Characteristics
Male % 70.59 76.50 77.19
Age (in years at time of LM entry) 22.15 21.94 23.23
Educational Levels %
None 8.08 1.72 0.35
Reads & writes 1.16 0.88 0.33
Less then intermediate 5.48 4.61 4.16
Intermediate
52.67 48.62 23.56
Higher than intermediate 5.50 6.30 7.22
University 27.12 37.87 64.39
Job Regions in 1998 %
Greater Cairo 18.86 30.63 37.14
Alex. & Canal Cities 9.92 13.19 16.65
Lower Urban 13.91 17.00 11.81
Upper Urban 13.53 17.76 25.02
Lower Rural 17.03 9.13 1.12
Upper Rural 15.97 3.17 1.55
Father’s characteristics %
White collar 26.04 30.94 49.12
Illiterate 41.25 34.22 19.24
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the new labor law has had 
an impact on informal employment among those already employed but 
not among new entrants to the labor market. One potential explanation is 
that employers do not formalize the employment status of new workers 
who have just started their working careers. In the next sections, we 
explore the extent to which the findings so far can be attributed to the 
new labor law once the characteristics of individuals, jobs, and regions 
are controlled for. 
22
5. Empirical Analysis: The Effect of the Labor Law
5.1 Probability of Formal Jobs and the Labor Law
First, to study the effect of the new labor law on job contract holding, 
the probability of workers moving to a formal (i.e. protected by job con-
tract) PNARW job is estimated distinguishing between before and after 
the new law. 
First, we model the probability of a worker having a formal PNARW 
job in 2006 not having one in 1998. Let the latent variable y* represent the 
decision to have a formal PNARW job. We do not observe the decision, 
only whether it is made or not.
€ 
yis
* = Xβ + ε  …………………… (1) 
Therefore, we define y = 1 if the worker has moved to a formal PNARW 
job and 0 otherwise.
€ 
yis =1 if y* > 0,
€ 
yis = 0 if y* ≤ 0
We assume that the disturbances are normally distributed with mean 
zero and unit variance and estimate the equation using probit function 
where X is a set of explanatory variables, β is a set of corresponding coef-
ficients and Φ (.) is the cumulative standard distribution.
 
€ 
P (yis =1 | Xβ) = Φ(Xβ)
The probability of a worker i originally in state s moving to a formal 
PNARW job in 2006 is estimated where s =1, 2, 3; 1= informal PNAW job 
in 1998; 2= informal PNA job in 1998; 3= notPNAW in 1998 (no restric-
tion on contract in 1998 is imposed). This group, s=3, includes those who 
were not working in 1998, i.e. students, housewives, unemployed but not 
retired or disabled persons, agricultural workers, non-waged workers 
(self-employed and employers) and public sector work as long as those 
individuals were working in 2006 and were not originally PNAW work-
ers in 1998. 
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To examine the effect of the new labor law a dummy for 2003–05 is 
used since the law was introduced in July 2003.5 The public sector has 
played a major role in the Egyptian labor market since the 1950s with 
the guaranteed civil-service employment for graduates of secondary and 
higher educational institutions. Since 1991, the Egyptian government 
embarked on various economic reforms and downsizing the public sector 
was one of them. According to Assaad (2007) employment in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) started to decline in the 1988–98 decade, but employ-
ment in government was still growing rapidly during that period at about 
twice the rate of the growth of overall employment. This has changed 
in 1998–2006 when employment growth in the civil service has slowed 
dramatically. The public sector has been the preferred sector of employ-
ment for many new entrants to the labor market, particularly women. 
Although the government has slowed down its hiring, it is still the case 
that the public sector plays a major role in individuals’ choices. To capture 
this, we use the growth in public sector employment, as a proportion of 
total employment, by governorate between1998–2006.6 For individuals 
who were working in 1998 (s =1,2) this is based on the governorate of work 
location in 1998. For s =3, this is based on the governorate of residence in 
1998 rather than work since this group includes individuals who were not 
working in 1998.
We also control for job characteristics by including years of tenure 
before 1998 to capture the length of work experience. Job occupation in 
1998 is also included, in particular whether the worker’s occupation was 
professional work in 1998. Given the regional variation, regional dummies 
are included for the six main regions in Egypt. For s=3, we control for the 
various “working status” in 1998 by including self employment, unpaid 
family work, and housewives as covariates. 
Individual characteristics are also captured using male dummy, three 
age groups: 20–29, 30–29, and 40–49 years old. We restrict our analysis to 
those aged 20–50 years of age in 1998. Also, educational level is controlled 
for using six dummies. Finally, we control for family background, we use 
father’s characteristics: if father is illiterate and if father was white collar 
worker when the individual was 15 years of age.
5 Jobs that started in 2006 were excluded since there are very few observations pertaining to 2006, 
the year of the survey. However, robustness checks were undertaken whereby including 2006 and the 
findings were unaltered. 
6 Source: Egypt Human Development Report, various issues.
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Tables A2–A5 present the marginal effects. First, the effect of the labor 
law on the probability of moving to formal PNARW job overall is positive 
and significant indicating that the new labor law has had a positive impact 
on formal employment. The predicted probability of moving from informal 
to formal PNARW has increased in 2003–05 relative to 1998–2002 as fig-
ure 9 shows. The predicted probability of an informal worker moving from 
PNAW employment into formal PNARW job increased from 9% to 46% 
after the law for a reference worker.7 The predicted probability of an unpro-
tected worker moving from PNA employment into protected PNARW job 
increased from 10% to 42% after the law for a reference worker. Finally, the 
predicted probability for a notPNAW in 1998 moving into formal PNARW 
job increased from 9% to 12% in 2003–05.8 
Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Formal PNARW Jobs
Moving on to the other determinants of moving to protected employ-
ment, a number of factors play a significant role. First, and foremost the 
growth of public sector employment has a negative impact on moving into 
formal PNARW jobs, suggesting that workers still ranked the public sector 
7 Reference person for PNA98–PNARW06 and PNAW98–PNARW06: male, 20–29 years of age, 
worked in Greater Cairo in 1998, father is not illiterate and is white collar worker.
8 Reference person for notPNAW98–PNARW06: male, 20–29 years of age, lives in urban areas, not 
self employed, not housewife, not unpaid family worker in 1998, father is not illiterate and is white 
collar worker.
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as their preferred employment: in governorates where the public sector grew, 
the likelihood of workers moving into the private formal sector was lower.
As for individual characteristics, males were more likely to move to 
formal job. Although there was a negative relationship between age and 
mobility into formal jobs, this relationship was only significant for those 
who originated in notPNAW. The effect of education was not very strong 
after controlling for the public sector. Professional workers were more 
likely to move to protected jobs relative to other occupations. Duration of 
job tenure prior to 1998 seems to reduce the likelihood of moving although 
was not always significant. For those who were notPNAW in 1998, house-
wives, unpaid family workers, self-employed workers, all tend to be less 
likely than waged workers to move into formal employment. Family back-
ground matters: an illiterate father or a non-white collar worker reduce the 
probability of transition into protected jobs.9
The Probability of Formal PNARW First Jobs
Given our interest in the effect of the labor law on new entrants to the 
labor market, we examine this by estimating a binary probit model of the 
probability of a new entrant between 1998 and 2006 having a formal (con-
tract) PNARW first job. 
We use the same controls used above with the exception of job char-
acteristics, which do not apply since those individuals were not working 
in 1998. To examine the effect of the new labor law a dummy for 2003–05 
is used, but also year dummies were used, but were not significant, and are 
thus not reported. To capture the effect of public sector employment, the 
governorate of residence of the individual in 1998 is used. We limit our 
analysis to those aged 18–45 at the time of the first job, and use age in years 
at the time of first entry to the labor market.
As Table A6 shows, the labor law has had no significant impact for secur-
ing protected first jobs. In fact, the predicted probability of a formal private 
non-agricultural regular waged first job was around 30% before and after 
2003. There is also evidence of the importance of the growth of public 
sector employment which has a negative impact on workers getting for-
mal PNARW first jobs as found above. As for individual characteristics, 
9 Father’s education and occupation tend to be correlated. In addition, father’s education is som -
times correlated to the worker’s education level. Hence the tables provide various experiments to show 
the potential influence of those covariates.
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there is a negative relationship between age and getting a formal first job in 
PNARW sector. The effect of education is stronger here, with the educated 
being more likely to secure a protected first job relative to the uneducated. 
This is consistent with section 4, where the descriptive statistics 
revealed that the labor law did not really affect employment of new 
entrants to the labor market. To analyze the effect of the labor law further, 
the next sub-section studies the hazard rates into formal jobs before and 
after the law came into effect.
5.2 Hazard Rates into PNARW
This sub-section examines the impact of the new labor law on the haz-
ard rates of exits into formal PNARW employment. The hazard function 
is the product of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a job offer 
and the probability of accepting the job offer. We estimate a reduced form 
model where the total effects of the variables on exiting into protected 
PNARW employment is estimated rather than their separate effects on 
the two probabilities.10 
Given the nature of the data, durations are grouped into a discrete time 
interval (years). We measure the duration from 1998 till the time of exit or 
till 2006 which is the time of the survey (right censored). So, we estimate 
the probability of exiting to protected PNARW employment in a discrete 
time framework. In addition, we take account of unobserved heterogene-
ity. Based on Jenkins (2004), we estimate by maximum likelihood a discrete 
time (grouped duration data) proportional hazards regression model: (1) 
the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model; and (2) the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) 
model incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unob-
served individual heterogeneity, as proposed by Meyer (1990). We chose 
a piece-wise specification to capture the effect of the labor law. We’ve also 
experimented with non-parametric specification using year dummies. For 
further details on the PGH models, see Jenkins (2004).
In model 1, the discrete time hazard rate for person i in the time inter-
val j to exit to a formal PNARW employment can be written as:
€ 
hj X i j( ) =1− exp −exp X i j 'β + θ t( )[ ]{ }……………………. (2)
10  Jenkins (2004).
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where Xij is a set of covariates, β are the coefficients to be estimated, 
and θ(t) is the functional form of how the duration of the spell affects the 
hazard rate. 
Model 2 incorporates a Gamma distributed random variable to describe 
unobserved (or omitted) heterogeneity between individuals. The discrete-
time hazard function is:
€ 








The same covariates used before are included. To capture the effect of 
the new labor law, we use a dummy for 2003–05. The piece-wise constant 
baseline hazard specification is therefore the preferred specification for the 
baseline hazard estimated in this study. As before, we estimate exit from 
three different states: 1. the hazard rate for exit from informal PNAW to 
formal PNARW; 2. the hazard rate for exit from informal PNA to formal 
PNARW; 3. the hazard rate for exit from notPNAW to formal PNARW. 
Model 2 with unobserved individual heterogeneity (frailty) was never 
significant, and therefore the results from model 1 only are reported 
below in TablesA6–A8. The figures reported are the estimated coeffi-
cients.11 First, examining the effect of the new labor law on exits to formal 
PNARW employment, the evidence suggests a positive significant impact 
for exits from PNAW, PNA, and notPNAW. Although for exits from not-
PNAW, the effect is weaker once a full set of controls are used. As Table 4 
shows, the hazard rate increased from around 3% to 14% for PNAW98–
PNARW06. However, for notPNAW98–PNARW06, the increase was 
small: from only 1.7% to 3%, albeit the evidence suggests that the new 
labor law has had a positive and significant impact on the hazard rate of 
exiting into formal PNARW jobs.
In addition, the public sector plays an important role in exits to formal 
PNARW jobs, suggesting that to a large degree public sector employment 
dominates private sector ones. In fact, the findings strongly indicate that 
11 Note that the proportionate impact of each variable on the state-specific hazard rate can be 
calculated by taking the exponent of the coefficient.
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those institutional factors related to the labor law and the public sector 
tend to be more important than individual characteristics of workers. 
Finally for new entrants, we estimate the hazard rate for a new entrant 
to the labor market exiting to protected PNARW job. To capture the 
effect of the new labor law, we use a dummy for 2003–05 and thus adopt a 
piece-wise constant baseline hazard specification. A number of individual, 
family, and regional controls are used as before. 
As Table A9 shows, the new labor law has had no significant impact on 
formal PNARW first jobs. The hazard rate was 6.2% before the law and 
5.8% after, but that difference was insignificant. However, as was evident 
before, the public sector plays a significant role in affecting the hazard rate 
of exits to formal PNARW first jobs. 







First Job:  
PNARW06
2003–2005 14.04 13.97 3.27 5.77*
1998–2002 3.19 3.64 1.68 6.16*
Notes: For a reference person. *Not statistically significant.
6. Conclusion 
The introduction of the new labor law in 2003 provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to study the impact of more flexible employment 
protection regulations on employment. In particular, this paper examines 
the effect of the new labor law on formal jobs (i.e. those with contracts) 
in the private non-agricultural regular waged sector. The findings suggest 
that the new law has had a positive impact on those who were employed in 
1998 in the private non-agricultural sector and in the private non-agricul-
tural waged sector. However, the law has had no significant impact for the 
new entrants to the labor market. A possible explanation is that employ-
ers do not formalize the employment status of new entrants to the labor 
market. Another important finding is that the growth of public sector 
employment is an important determinant of mobility into formal private 
non-agricultural regular waged work. Workers in governorates with high 
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public sector employment growth are less likely to move into formal pri-
vate non-agriculture waged employment.
The findings are encouraging: labor flexibility increases formal 
employment. This should encourage further reforms pertaining to the 
labor market to increase flexibility in the labor market such as reducing 
the social security contribution by employers and workers to attempt to 
reduce informalization and achieve decent employment. However, policy-
makers must recognize that labor regulation is only one part of the broader 
economic policy framework. Its interaction with the regulation of product 
markets, macroeconomic policy, and the business investment climate will 
determine the overall labor market performance.
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Appendix
Table A1: Moves Before and After 2003 
PNAW98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 94.67 5.33 100
93.46 66.29 91.47
2003–2005 70.96 29.04 100
6.54 33.71 8.53
Total 92.65 7.35 100
100 100 100
PNA98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 94.14 5.87 100
92.31 64.78 90.07
2003–2005 71.13 28.87 100
7.69 35.22 9.93
Total 91.86 8.14 100
100 100 100
notPNAW98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 97.32 2.68 100
90.6 67.38 89.77
2003–2005 88.62 11.38 100
9.4 32.62 10.23
Total 96.43 3.57 100
100 100 100
Notes: In each entry, the first figure is the % of the row; the second figure in italics is the % in the 
given column.
PNAW98: private non-agriculture waged employment in 1998; PNA98: private non-agriculture 
employment in 1998; notPNAW98: not private non-agriculture waged in 1998; PNARW06: private 
non-agriculture regular waged in 2006.
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Table A2: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects













2003–2005 dummy 0.237 0.242 0.236 0.268 0.281 0.267
(5.53)** (5.60)** (5.56)** (5.65)** (5.77)** (5.67)**
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(2.47)* (2.38)* (2.31)* (2.32)* (2.29)* (2.18)*
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.040 0.045 0.039
(1.53) (2.38)* (1.60)
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 0.002 -0.018 -0.002
(0.06) (0.46) (0.19) (0.08) (0.95) (0.07)
40–49 years -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.016 -0.036 -0.018
(0.52) (0.68) (0.57) (0.33) (1.20) (0.39)
Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011
(0.20) (0.19) (0.37) (0.19) (0.16) (0.36)
Less than interm. -0.013 -0.011 -0.020 -0.014 -0.007 -0.021
(0.52) (0.45) (0.86) (0.53) (0.26) (0.85)
Intermediate 0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.017 -0.006
(0.26) (0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.61) (0.23)
Higher than interm. -0.010 -0.011 -0.018 -0.013 0.002 -0.020
(0.25) (0.27) (0.48) (0.30) (0.05) (0.50)
University 0.017 -0.024 0.001 0.026 0.003 0.009
(0.45) (0.73) (0.03) (0.60) (0.09) (0.25)
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.87) (0.59) (0.70) (0.97) (0.63) (0.79)
Professional in ‘98 0.220 0.161
(2.30)* (1.97)*
Job Region in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex & Canal Cities 0.035 0.044 0.035 0.046 0.052 0.045
(1.31) (1.58) (1.38) (1.51) (1.65) (1.54)
continued u
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Lower Urban 0.012 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.018
(0.36) (0.58) (0.40) (0.47) (0.59) (0.49)
Upper Urban 0.027 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.037
(0.93) (1.14) (1.14) (0.96) (1.06) (1.14)
Lower Rural 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.007
(0.03) (0.21) (0.18) (0.03) (0.12) (0.16)
Upper Rural 0.048 0.056 0.060 0.054 0.058 0.066
(0.90) (1.02) (1.09) (0.93) (0.97) (1.12)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.052 0.045 0.033 0.043 0.041 0.025
(2.44)* (2.22)* (1.67) (1.97)* (1.83) (1.20)
Illiterate -0.041 -0.044
(2.23)* (2.14)*
No of Obs. 570 570 570 533 533 533
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table A3: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
PNA in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
All All All Males Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003–2005 dummy 0.212 0.215 0.208 0.239 0.249 0.235
(5.39)** (5.47)** (5.39)** (5.54)** (5.65)** (5.55)**
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(2.61)** (2.53)* (2.53)* (2.48)* (2.47)* (2.41)*
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.047 0.051 0.045
(1.69) (2.53)* (1.76)
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.010 -0.016 0.006
(0.20) (0.20) (0.07) (0.36) (0.83) (0.21)
40–49 years 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.026 0.004
(0.00) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.82) (0.07)
continued u
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Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.004
(0.32) (0.31) (0.12) (0.30) (0.31) (0.12)
Less than interm. -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 -0.010 -0.001 -0.019
(0.30) (0.25) (0.66) (0.33) (0.04) (0.68)
Intermediate 0.022 0.022 0.010 0.018 0.039 0.006
(0.73) (0.74) (0.36) (0.54) (1.21) (0.20)
Higher than interm. 0.025 0.025 0.008 0.024 0.061 0.008
(0.48) (0.48) (0.18) (0.43) (0.98) (0.16)
University 0.032 -0.018 0.011 0.042 0.022 0.021
(0.73) (0.48) (0.30) (0.85) (0.46) (0.48)
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(1.07) (0.80) (0.91) (1.19) (1.02)
Professional in ‘98 0.213 0.159
(2.22)* (1.91)
Job Regions in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex. & Canal Cities 0.028 0.036 0.028 0.037 0.042 0.035
(1.01) (1.26) (1.04) (1.17) (1.29) (1.18)
Lower Urban 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.014
(0.24) (0.43) (0.28) (0.35) (0.45) (0.38)
Upper Urban 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.023
(0.45) (0.64) (0.68) (0.51) (0.59) (0.71)
Lower Rural 0.044 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.057
(1.18) (1.36) (1.31) (1.22) (1.30) (1.34)
Upper Rural 0.030 0.034 0.039 0.034 0.032 0.044
(0.56) (0.64) (0.72) (0.59) (0.56) (0.75)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.059 0.053 0.040 0.051 0.050 0.032
(2.66)** (2.47)* (1.90) (2.23)* (2.12)* (1.47)
Illiterate -0.042 -0.045
(2.27)* (2.21)*
No of Obs. 603 603 603 565 565 565
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table A4: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
All All All All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.004
(2.50)* (2.43)* (1.40) (1.45)
Public Jobs -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(5.00)** (4.89)** (4.41)** (3.23)**
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(1.96) )* (1.99)* (1.88) (1.94)*
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years -0.018 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011
(6.06)** (6.08)** (4.07)** (4.04)**
40–49 years -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004
(5.21)** (5.23)** (1.84) (1.33)
Educational Levels (ref.: None)
Reads & writes 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.45) (0.43) (0.50)
Less than interm. 0.013 0.011 0.010
(1.36) (1.20) (1.20)
Intermediate 0.012 0.009 0.008
(1.62) (1.31) (1.31)
Higher than interm. 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.003
(1.91) (1.63) (1.84) (0.71)
University 0.029 0.023 0.029 0.004
(3.03)** (2.57)* (3.35)** (1.97)*
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.0004 -0.0004
(2.66)** (3.01)**
Professional in ‘98 -0.010
(5.21)**
Self employed in ‘98 -0.005
(1.55)




Housewife in ‘98 -0.006
(1.63)
Urban -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(2.23)* (2.14)* (1.72) (1.70)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005
(1.81) (1.18) (1.72) (2.29) *
Illiterate -0.004
(1.73)
No. of Obs. 3880 3880 3880 3880
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table A5: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006: Males 
Males Males Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.010
(2.20)* (1.77) (2.11)* (1.54)
Public Jobs -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(4.05)** (3.71)** (3.96)** (3.44)**
Individual Characteristics
Age
30–39 years -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012
(3.36)** (3.11)** (3.39)** (3.13)**
40–49 years -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.24) (0.53) (0.36) (0.66)
Educational Levels (ref.: None)
Reads & writes 0.013
(0.67)
Less than interm. 0.007 0.008 0.011
(0.67) (0.80) (0.81)




Higher than interm. 0.008 0.017 0.011 0.004
(0.74) (1.34) (0.79) (0.78)
University 0.015 0.032 0.016 0.013
(1.53) (2.79)** (1.31) (3.49)**
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(2.95)** (2.55)* (2.87)** (2.46)**
Professional in ‘98 -0.013 -0.011
(4.36)** (4.18)**
Self employed in ‘98 -0.007
(1.73)
Unpaid worker in ‘98 0.0001
(0.04)
Urban -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(1.59) (1.31) (1.44) (1.30)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004
(1.98)* (1.89) (1.34) (1.43)
Illiterate -0.007 -0.007
(1.99)* (2.09)*
No. of Obs. 2709 2709 2709 2709
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A6: Probability of First Job with Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
(PNARW in 2006)
All All Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017
(0.96) (0.98) (1.16) (1.17)
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007




Age 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.012
(2.25)* (2.08)* (4.70)** (4.66)**
Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes 0.158 0.140
(1.09) (1.03)
Less than interm. 0.272 0.245 0.079 0.074
(2.32)* (2.17)* (0.75) (0.71)
Intermediate 0.118 0.105 0.023 0.022
(1.89) (1.71) (0.33) (0.30)
Higher than interm. 0.348 0.294 0.098 0.093
(2.73)** (2.43)* (0.94) (0.90)
University 0.357 0.307 0.113 0.108
(3.60)** (3.21)** (1.28) (1.22)
Job Region (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex. & Canal Cities 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.016
(0.51) (0.55) (0.74) (0.72)
Lower Urban -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.22) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00)
Upper Urban 0.021 0.021 0.045 0.045
(1.19) (1.20) (2.02)* (2.02)*
Lower Rural -0.076 -0.073 -0.091 -0.091
(3.73)** (3.63)** (2.82)** (2.81)**
Upper Rural -0.076 -0.073 -0.068 -0.068








No. of Obs. 1666 1666 1145 1145
Notes. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table A7: Hazard Rate of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Males
PNAW98 - PNAW06 PNA98 - PNAW06
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 
dummy 1.839 5.49 1.859 5.5 1.715 5.4 1.715 5.36
Public Jobs -0.169 -2.14 -0.174 -2.16 -0.146 -2.19 -0.148 -2.16
Individual Characteristics
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years 0.111 0.2 -0.043 -0.08 0.211 0.41 0.099 0.19
40–49 years -15.813 -0.01 -15.984 -0.01 -0.658 -0.52 -0.914 -0.72
Educational Level (ref: none)
Reads and 
writes 0.191 0.23 -0.025 -0.03 0.621 0.81 0.429 0.55
Less than 
interm.  -0.143 -0.2 -0.312 -0.42 0.129 0.18 -0.086 -0.12
Intermediate 0.165 0.23 0.009 0.01 0.559 0.8 0.364 0.51
Higher than 
interm. -0.182 -0.17 -0.372 -0.35 0.562 0.6 0.317 0.33
University 0.407 0.47 0.222 0.25 0.733 0.87 0.522 0.61
Job Region in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex & Canal 
Cities 0.788 1.78 0.902 2.02 0.663 1.55 0.745 1.73
Lower Urban 0.411 0.62 0.557 0.81 0.199 0.32 0.297 0.47
Upper Urban 0.607 1.18 0.772 1.46 0.297 0.61 0.451 0.91
Lower Rural 0.321 0.39 0.519 0.63 0.805 1.35 0.921 1.53
Upper Rural -0.323 -0.3 0.030 0.03 -0.495 -0.46 -0.249 -0.23
continued u
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Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before 
‘98 -0.042 -1.00 -0.030 -0.72 -0.046 -1.13 -0.037 -0.91
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.693 1.83 0.461 1.16 0.700 2.04 0.460 1.28
Illiterate -0.816 -2.20 -0.755 -2.17
Constant -8.109 -4.54 -7.827 -4.29 -7.912 -5.14 -7.492 -4.78
person-years 4091 4091 4326 4326
Log 
Likelihood -194.69 -192.17 -220.30 -217.87
Table A8: Hazard Rate of Holding a Job Contract in 2006 
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 dummy 0.410 1.68 0.191 0.78 0.459 1.71 0.270 1.00
Public Jobs -0.129 -4.35 -0.122 -3.98 -0.127 -3.83 -0.122 -3.58
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.587 2.18 0.401 1.46
Age
30–39 years -1.859 -3.32 -1.771 -3.07 -1.530 -2.33 -1.499 -2.24
40–49 years -0.423 -0.64 -0.658 -0.93 0.408 0.5 0.006 0.01
Educational Levels 
Read & write 1.058 0.75 0.770 0.54
Less than interm. 1.252 1.13 0.985 0.88
Intermediate 1.258 1.21 1.070 1.01
Higher than 
interm. 1.520 1.41 1.481 1.34 0.321 0.72 0.458 1.02
University 1.790 1.74 1.861 1.73 0.547 1.86 0.816 2.6
Urban -0.791 -2.47 -0.685 -2.11 -0.711 -2.11 -0.618 -1.82
continued u
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Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.104 -3.61 -0.078 -2.64 -0.128 -3.59 -0.096 -2.8
Professional ‘98 -2.225 -4.26 -1.861 -3.54
Self employed ‘98 -0.896 -1.49 -0.787 -1.3
Unpaid ‘98 -0.049 -0.11 -0.077 -0.16
Housewife ‘98 -1.180 -1.12
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.403 1.84 0.293 1.28 0.469 1.94 0.329 1.31
Illiterate -0.396 -1.33 -0.527 -1.57
Constant -7.953 -6.45 -7.318 -5.68 -6.215 -7.53 -5.982 -7.11
person-year 30547 30547 21272 21272
Log likelihood         -524.12 -504.583 -418.674 -406.262
Table A9: Hazard Rate of First Job with Contract in 2006
(PNARW in 2006)
All Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 
dummy -0.150 -1.04 -0.142 -0.99 -0.164 -0.96 -0.161 -0.94
Public Jobs -0.081 -2.65 -0.080 -2.64 -0.069 -2.05 -0.069 -2.05
Individual Characteristics
Male -0.008 -0.05 -0.011 -0.07
Age -0.139 -5.96 -0.137 -5.9 -0.078 -2.45 -0.078 -2.44
Education 
Less than interm 1.538 1.97 1.646 2.12
Intermediate 1.018 1.37 1.127 1.52
Higher than 
interm 1.539 2.00 1.665 2.17 0.450 1.37 0.458 1.40
University 1.735 2.36 1.881 2.58 0.556 2.66 0.570 2.75
continued u
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Job Region in 98 (ref. Greater Cairo)
Alex., Canal 
Cities 0.025 0.13 0.034 0.18 0.083 0.37 0.087 0.39
Lower Urban -0.153 -0.57 -0.155 -0.57 -0.161 -0.51 -0.159 -0.5
Upper Urban 0.160 0.8 0.153 0.77 0.322 1.44 0.322 1.44
Lower Rural -1.970 -3.25 -2.014 -3.32 -2.775 -2.71 -2.788 -2.73
Upper Rural -1.809 -2.98 -1.859 -3.07 -1.371 -2.24 -1.384 -2.26
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.171 1.12 0.235 1.6 0.110 0.62 0.132 0.77
Illiterate -0.291 -1.48 -0.094 -0.43
Constant -2.694 -2.35 -2.945 -2.61 -2.820 -2.84 -2.876 -2.93
person-year 7102 7102 3811 3811
Log likelihood           -821.448 -822.594 -597.764 -597.859
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3Abstract
This paper examines the effect of the new labor law of 2003, which 
provides flexibility in the hiring and firing procedures since labor market 
inflexibility was seen as one of the obstacles to job creation in Egypt. The 
analysis focuses on the effect of the new law on formal employment (jobs 
with contracts) in the private non-agricultural regular waged sector. The 
findings suggest that the new law has had a positive impact on those who 
were employed in 1998 in the private non-agricultural sector and in the pri-
vate non-agricultural waged sector. However, the effect was not significant 
for new entrants to the labor market looking for first jobs. 
1. Introduction
Egypt has undergone a number of economic reform measures since the 
early 1990s, with the aim of liberalizing the economy and moving toward a 
market economy. As a result, among other measures, the Egyptian govern-
ment has introduced a new labor law (No. 12) with the goal of increasing 
flexibility in the labor market. Law 12, which came in effect in July 2003, 
provides comprehensive guidelines for the recruitment, hiring, compen-
sation, and termination of employees. In particular, it provides increased 
flexibility for firms in the hiring/firing process, which has been a major 
bottleneck for job creation in the Egyptian labor market.
The introduction of the new labor law in Egypt provides us with an 
opportunity to study the impact of regulations that aim to provide more 
flexibility in the labor market. Indeed, there is a wide disagreement among 
economists on the benefits of labor market regulations and on the impact 
of labor market flexibility on employment in particular. Some economists 
believe that unregulated labor markets are superior to regulated ones. On the 
other hand, others argue that regulations are needed to protect poor and vul-
nerable workers.1 Given the change in the law, this paper examines the effect 
of introducing more flexible employment protection legislation in Egypt.
This paper will explore the following issues: What is the effect of the 
new labor law on informalization? Does the introduction of more flexible 
1  See Freeman (1993) for a summary of this debate.
4labor codes that facilitate the hiring/firing process lead to an increase in 
formal employment? This is an important issue for developing countries, 
like Egypt, where the informal sector has been growing recently and has 
become the main employer in the economy. Yet informal employment 
tends to be of low quality with no job security and no social security cover-
age. From a policy perspective, it is essential to investigate whether a more 
flexible labor market would encourage the growth of the private formal 
sector leading to more protected jobs.
The structure of the paper will be as follows. Section 2 will review the 
previous literature dealing with labor market regulations and focus on the 
effect of employment protection regulations. Section 3 will discuss Egypt’s 
Labor Law no. 12 and its aims. Section 4 will examine what has happened 
to informalization in Egypt in general and then whether the new labor 
law has had any impact on informal employment. Section 5 will go beyond 
descriptive analysis to test for the impact of the new labor law for different 
groups of workers. Section 6 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The functioning of labor markets depends on institutions and regu-
lations. For example, labor market regulations can affect the rate of job 
creation and destruction, the levels of employment and unemployment 
in the economy, and the degree of social protection provided to workers. 
However, there is wide disagreement among economists on the benefits of 
labor market regulations. Some economists believe that unregulated labor 
markets are superior to regulated ones; i.e. more efficient. They argue that 
labor market regulations introduce distortions that misallocate labor; waste 
resources through rent seeking, impede adjustments to economic shocks, 
discourage hiring, and favor “insiders” (such as regular workers, or males) 
and therefore reduce growth. Freeman (1993) refers to that view as the “dis-
tortionist.” On the other hand, some believe that due to market failure and 
the ensuing injustice and inequity, regulations are needed to protect poor 
and vulnerable workers. This is referred to as the “institutionalist” view.2
There are various forms of labor regulations. In general, labor market 
regulations are introduced with the objective of protecting workers from 
2  See Freeman (1993) for a summary of this debate.
5uninsurable labor market risk, such as employment risk, or from earnings risk. 
To improve the earnings of the most disadvantaged categories of workers, 
governments typically set minimum wages; they might also mandate that 
employers provide non-wage benefits to their workers, such as healthcare, 
paid vacations, maternity leave, etc. To protect workers from employment 
risk, governments can decide to protect existing jobs by restricting the 
ability of firms to lay off employees at will and/or provide unemployment 
insurance to those who lose their job. (Boeri et al. 2008)
In this paper, the focus is on one particular set of labor market regula-
tions namely employment protection, or job security, rules that refer to 
hiring and firing arrangements. These can cover what kinds of contracts 
are allowed, the conditions under which workers can be terminated, 
requirements for severance and advance notice of termination, redun-
dancy procedures, and special rules for mass layoffs. 
The degree to which employment protection rules are rigid or flex-
ible can affect labor market outcomes including employment levels, labor 
dynamics (i.e. employment fluctuations), and the composition of employ-
ment. Rigid employment rules are expected to lengthen job tenure and 
reduce labor turnover, protecting the jobs of incumbent employees and lim-
iting hiring opportunities. At the same time, rigid job security rules affect 
the composition of employment by shifting labor to uncovered (informal) 
sectors or employment types. Obviously, the effectiveness of labor regula-
tion will depend on the extent to which those regulations are enforced. 
Betcherman et al (2001) summarize the theoretical impact of strict 
termination rules as follows: lower labor turnover rates (hirings plus 
separations);   lower aggregate employment levels; greater numbers of 
long-tenure jobs; lower labor force participation rates; no clear impact on 
unemployment levels, but longer average unemployment durations; at a 
macro level, slower recovery from an aggregate shock; more self-employ-
ment as a share of total employment; more non-standard employment 
(e.g., part-time or temporary); positive employment effects for skilled 
prime-age males but lower employment for women, young people, and 
less-skilled workers. They add that the empirical findings are strongest for 
the dynamic effects—on turnover and tenure and flows between employ-
ment and unemployment and in terms of who benefits from employment 
protection rules and who does not. For example, in Latin America there is 
evidence of negative employment effects of job security rules. 
In the last two decades or so, there has been a move toward labor mar-
ket flexibility and many countries introduced labor market reforms to 
6enhance productivity, competition, and to accelerate employment genera-
tion and improve economic performance. Yet the empirical evidence on 
the effects of labor flexibility is mixed.
The main empirical evidence on the effect of labor market flexibility has 
focused mainly on developed countries but have more recently included 
studies on less-developed countries (LDCs). The focus of the studies on 
DCs has been on whether excessively strict employment protection law 
has been an important contributor to the persistently high unemploy-
ment experienced in many countries that are part of the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). However, the empir-
ical research has not provided a clear-cut answer. Early on, Lazear (1990), 
using data on severance pay and periods of notice required before employ-
ment termination for 22 developed countries for the period 1956–84, found 
some evidence that they have a negative relationship with the employment 
rate and a positive one with the unemployment rate. 
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005), using a new data set on hiring and fir-
ing restrictions for 21 OECD countries for the period 1984–90 based on 
surveys of business people in the countries covered, controlling for coun-
try and time fixed effects, and adopting dynamic panel data techniques, 
found evidence that increasing the flexibility of the labor market increases 
both the employment rate and the rate of participation in the labor force. 
There is also some evidence that more flexibility leads to lower unemploy-
ment rates and to lower rates of long-term unemployment. They also found 
evidence consistent with the hypothesis that inflexible labor markets pro-
duce “jobless recoveries” and introduce more unemployment persistence.
As argued by Boeri et al. (2008), developing countries are often funda-
mentally different from developed economies. Poorer countries tend to 
have stricter labor regulations compared to richer countries, even though 
they offer less social protection. At the same time, rigid labor regulation is 
associated with a larger informal sector that is associated with worse work-
ing conditions and poor job “quality” (Boeri et al. [2008]). Developing 
countries are often characterized by weak law enforcement, a large infor-
mal sector, underdeveloped capital markets, and informal credit and 
insurance networks. Ignoring these features when studying developing 
economies can be problematic. 
According to the World Bank in Doing Business 2009, developing coun-
tries tend to mistakenly go to the extreme of rigid regulations, pushing 
employers and workers into the informal sector. Overly rigid regulations 
may have undesirable effects such as less job creation, smaller company 
7size, less investment in research and development, and longer spells of 
unemployment and thus the obsolescence of skills, all of which may reduce 
productivity growth. Hence excessive rigidity can be to the detriment of 
businesses and workers alike.
Recent studies have examined the effect of labor market regulations 
and labor market flexibility in developing countries. For example, Kingdon 
et al. (2006) argue that the failure of African labor markets to create good 
paying jobs was the result of lack of labor market “flexibility” keeping for-
mal sector wages above their equilibrium level and restricting job creation. 
This has resulted in excess labor supply in the form of either open unem-
ployment or a growing self-employment sector. 
Besley and Burgess (2004) examine the link between regulation and 
long-term development in India by looking at state amendments to the 
Industrial Disputes Act of 1947. Their empirical evidence suggests that 
labor regulation is a key factor in the pattern of manufacturing develop-
ment in India. Regulating in a pro-worker direction was associated with 
lower levels of investment, employment, productivity and output in regis-
tered manufacturing. It also increased informal sector activity.
Kugler (2004) examines impact of the Colombian labor market reform 
of 1990 which substantially reduced the costs of dismissing workers 
through the reduction of severance payments on unemployment. Using 
micro-level data from Colombia, she finds that those reforms contributed 
to 10% of the reduction in unemployment during the period of study. 
In the next section, the changes in labor regulations in Egypt are 
described first before examining the impact of those employment protec-
tion reforms on informal/formal employment.
3. The New Labor Law
The Egyptian government introduced a new labor law (No.12) in 2003. 
The new law provides comprehensive guidelines for the recruitment, hir-
ing, compensation, and termination of employees. The law comprises 257 
articles that address all the legal aspects regulating the Egyptian labor mar-
ket. The law aims to increase private sector involvement and at the same 
time achieve a balance between employees’ and employers’ rights. 
Among the most important issues that the new law addresses is the right 
of an employer to fire an employee and the conditions pertaining to this, as 
well as granting employees the right to carry out a peaceful strike according 
8to controls and procedures prescribed in the new law. In particular, the new 
law provides increased flexibility for firms in the hiring/firing process, which 
has been a major bottleneck for job creation in the Egyptian labor market. 
The new labor law allows private sector employers to renew a tem-
porary contract without transforming it automatically into a permanent 
employment status as was stated in the preceding law. Also, under the new 
regulation, employers can terminate a contract more easily and lay offs can 
be justified by difficult economic conditions. In return, workers that have 
been dismissed have the right to appeal. However, this law does not apply 
to public servants of state agencies, including local government units and 
public authorities, nor to self-employed workers. 
Until July 2003, when the new labor law was enforced, existing legis-
lation had been rather stringent both for workers and for employers. It 
prohibited employers from terminating the contract of a worker after a 
probation period. In addition, employers were not allowed to recruit work-
ers directly but through local employment offices.
Thus, given the new labor regulations, it seems important to exam-
ine the effect of the new labor on employment, in particular on informal 
employment. Theoretically, one would expect the new law to enable 
employers to hire and fire workers more easily and hence to enable them 
to hire more workers formally. In the following section we test the hypoth-
esis that the introduction of the new labor law has led to more formal 
private employment. 
4. What Has Happened to Informalization?
4.1 Data
The analysis in this paper will be based on Egypt Labor Market 
Panel Survey of 2006 (ELMPS06) which is a follow-up survey to Egypt 
Labor Market Survey of 1998 (ELMS98). Both surveys carried out by 
the Economic Research Forum (ERF) in cooperation with the Egyptian 
Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)—the 
main statistical agency of the Egyptian government. The ELMPS06 is the 
second round of what is intended to be a periodic longitudinal survey that 
tracks the labor market and demographic characteristics of the house-
holds and individuals interviewed in 1998, any new households that might 
have formed as a result of splits from the original households, as well as 
9a refresher sample of households to ensure that the data continue to be 
nationally representative.
The fieldwork for ELMPS06 was carried out from January to March 
2006. The final sample of 8,349 households is made up of 3,684 households 
from the original ELMS98 survey, 2,167 new households that emerged 
from these households as a result of splits, and a refresher sample of 2,498 
households. Of the 23,997 individuals interviewed in 1998, 17,357 (72%) were 
successfully re-interviewed in 2006, forming a panel that is used for our 
analysis. The attrition that occurred in the original 1998 sample was mostly 
random in nature since it resulted from the loss of records containing 
identifying information for the 1998 households at CAPMAS. Of the 1,115 
households that could not be re-interviewed, 615 are due to loss of records 
and the remainder is made up of expected losses due to total relocation of 
the household, death of all household members, or refusal to participate in 
the survey.3 The questionnaire for the ELMPS06 is closely based on that 
used in the ELMS98 to ensure comparability of the data over time.  
The surveys provide a rich source of information on labor market condi-
tions of individuals. The surveys collect information on the characteristics 
of jobs such as on the presence of legal job contract and social security cov-
erage. The paper will make use of the panel nature of ELMPS06 and of 
data on the characteristics of first jobs, as well as of the rich retrospective 
information on previous employment characteristics.
4.2 Informality Patterns and Trends
First, examining informality trends between 1998 and 2006 provides an 
interesting picture (Fig. 1). Looking at informality defined as lack of job 
contract and lack of social security suggests that informality has increased 
between 1998 and 2006 as a share of total employment and as a share of 
non-agriculture employment. However, limiting the scope to private non-
agriculture waged employment the share of informality has declined over 
this period. 
Measuring informality as lack of job contract only also provides a similar 
pattern. In 2006, 69% of private non-agricultural regular waged workers 
had no job contracts, down from 74% in 1998, thus suggesting that the 
decline in informality among private non-agriculture employment is due 
3 For more details, see Barsoum (2006). 
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to more workers holding job contracts and not to do with social security, 
which is what one would expect if the new labor law has had an impact. 
Figure 1: Proportion of Informal Employment
Public sector employees tend to be protected: they hold job contracts 
and have social security coverage, in addition to other benefits. The agri-
cultural sector is typically excluded from the informal sector since it has 
its own features: subsistence, family work, etc. Thus, the sector that is of 
interest to us is the private non-agricultural sector. Examining the compo-
sition of the non-agricultural informal employment, the evidence suggests 
a change between 1998 and 2006. As Figure 2 shows, the proportion of 
regular waged workers has increased by almost 15 percentage points and 
amounted to almost 60% in 2006. At the same time, the share of casual 
waged workers has also declined. Meanwhile the share of unpaid family 
workers also fell over this time period. This suggests that informal employ-
ment is increasingly becoming dominated by regular waged work and not 
self-employment or employers. 
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Figure 2: Composition of Informal (No Contract & No Social Security): Non-Agricultural 
Employment by Work Status
Given that the change in the labor law applies only to the private (non-
agricultural) sector and that only waged workers may hold contracts (i.e. 
self-employed workers and employers do not hold job contracts), the 
focus of this paper will be on private non-agricultural regular waged work. 
Regular work includes both permanent and temporary, but excludes sea-
sonal and intermittent. The aim of the paper is to test whether the new 
labor law affected the proportion of job contract holders among the pri-
vate non-agricultural regular waged workers (PNARW) in 2006. For the 
rest of the paper, informality refers to lack of job contract while formality 
refers to holding a job contract.
An important issue is whether the increase in job contract holders 
increased as a result of the law. Figure 3 shows the proportion of jobs with 
contracts that started between 1998 and 2006. There is no evidence that 
the new labor law has had an effect on the proportion of jobs with con-
tracts in PNARW (Fig. 3). However, limiting the analysis to those who 
were private non-agricultural regular waged workers in 1998 (PNARW98; 
Fig. 4a), the fitted trend line shows a positive trend suggesting that there 
has been an increase in formality (job contract holding) between 1998 and 
2006 among PNARW workers. A similar pattern emerges if the analysis 
is confined to those who were in private non-agricultural employment 
(waged and non-waged) in 1998—Fig. 4b. This indicates that among those 
were already employed in private non-agricultural sector there is evidence 
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that the labor law has had a positive impact on the likelihood of holding 
job contract in 2006. At the same time this suggests that the new entrants 
might be the ones who were not affected by the new labor law, an issue we 
investigate further below.
Figure 3: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
Figure 4a: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
13
Figure 4b: Proportion of Jobs with Contract by Year of Job Start
Over the last three decades, new entrants to the labor market have 
become increasingly likely to start their careers in the informal sector. 
Moktar and Wahba (2000) have found that in the early 1970s, 20% of 
workers used to start their working life with informal jobs, but by 1998, 
69% of new workers have started in informal employment. Figure 5 shows 
the proportion of first jobs without contracts between 1975 and 2005. 
There has been an increase in the trend of first jobs of those aged 18–45 
years of age being not protected by contracts over the whole period. This 
might explain why in Fig. 3, when we examine all jobs that started between 
1998 and 2006, we don’t find a positive trend since new entrants (first jobs) 
are included. 
14
Figure 5: Proportion of First Jobs without Contract
4.3 Transition to PNARW Jobs with Contracts
Next we examine the rate of transition for different types of work-
ers between 1998 and 2006 and limit the analysis to those who were aged 
20–50 years old in 1998. As seen in Table 1, around 8% of workers who were 
engaged in informal private non-agricultural employment (PNA) have 
become formal private non-agricultural regular waged (PNARW) workers 
in 2006. Also, 7% of workers who were informal PNAW in 1998 became 
formal PNARW by 2006. Finally among those who were notPNAW in 
1998, 4% acquired job contracts by 2006. This last group (notPNAW) 
includes those where not working in 1998, such as students and house-
wives, non-waged workers, agricultural workers, and public sector workers 
in 1998, but who were working in 2006. 
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Table 1: Transition Matrices
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006





Job Contract 1998 93.99 6.01 100 (33.21)
No Job Contract 1998 8.14 91.86 100 (66.79)
Total 36.66 63.34 100 (100)
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006
Job Contract 2006 No Job Contract 2006 Total
Private Non-
Agriculture Waged 
Work (PNAW) in 1998
Job Contract 1998 93.99 6.01 100 (34.43)
No Job Contract 1998 7.35 92.65 100 (65.57)
Total 37.18 62.82 100 (100)
Private Non-Agriculture Regular Waged Work (PNARW)
in 2006
Job Contract 2006 No Job Contract 2006 Total
Not Private Non-
Agriculture Waged 
Work (notPNAW) in 
1998
Job Contract 1998 97.88 2.12 100 (53.02)
No Job Contract 1998 4.22 95.78 100 (46.98)
Total 53.88 46.12 100 (100)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are the column sum in percent.
Table A1 provides the transition rate to formal PNARW before and 
after 2003, the year the law was introduced. Almost 34% of movers between 
informal PNAW98 and formal PNARW06 moved between 2003–05. 
However, 5% of the moves between 1998–2002 were moves from PNAW98 
to PNARW06 compared to 29% between 2003–05 as illustrated in Fig. 6. 
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Similar patterns are observed for moves between PNA98–PNARW06 
and notPNAW98–PNARW06 suggesting that the proportion of moves 
to PNARW was higher between 2003–05 than between 1998–2002, sup-
porting the hypothesis that the new labor law has had a positive impact 
on formal employment among employed workers. However, there doesn’t 
seem to be an impact for first jobs. 
Figure 6: Proportion of Job Moves Before & After 2003: By Time Period
A striking, yet unsurprising, aspect of the characteristics of informal 
workers in 1998 that became formal by 2006, i.e. movers, is that they are pre-
dominantly male. The transition rates for females to PNARW in 2006 are 
very low at around 2% if they were employed in 1998 and less than 1% for 
those who were notPNAW workers in 1998 (Fig. 7). The fundamental prob-
lem is that very few women are employed, as a proportion of working women, 
in the private non-agricultural waged sector. This has been highlighted in 
previous studies; see for example Wahba (2009) and Assaad (2007). 
Another important dimension of transition to formal PNARW in 2006 
is education. Those with university degrees who were employed in 1998 
with no contract had 16% probability of holding a contract in 2006 com-
pared to around 3% among the illiterates (Fig. 8). There is clear evidence 
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that education affects the transition rates from informal jobs to formal 
ones. This is consistent with Wahba (2009) who, using evidence from the 
ELMPS06, and controlling for selectivity into informal jobs, finds that 
the mobility from informal to semi-formal/formal employment is highly 
segmented along education and gender. She concludes that informal 
employment is a stepping stone for highly educated male workers, but is a 
dead end for the uneducated, and for female workers.
Figure 7: Transitional Rates by Gender
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Figure 8: Transitional Rates by Educational Levels
Characteristics of Movers
Table 2 presents the characteristics of movers distinguished by their orig-
inal type of employment in 1998. We study three types of workers as before 
who ended up in formal PNARW jobs in 2006. First, gender clearly plays 
an important role with the great majority of movers being males. Movers 
tend to be around two years younger on average to non-movers, although 
movers from notPNAW98 tend to be much younger than non-movers. As 
seen above, but here looking at the educational distribution of movers and 
non-movers, it is clear that movers on the whole are more educated than 
non-movers. Almost 58% of movers from PNAW98 or PNA98 have at least 
intermediate degrees. This is even more intensified among movers from not-
PNAW98 were 57% have university degrees. There is also some indication 
that the distribution of movers is not even across regions. Looking at the 
region of employment in 1998, more workers move in Alexandria and the 
canal cities and fewer in Lower (urban and rural) Egypt. Movers also tend 
to have about 5 years shorter job tenures than non-movers. Examining the 
occupations in 1998 shows that professionals are the most likely to move, 
which is not surprising given that professionals tend be on average better 
educated. However, it has to be noted that this is not reflected for those 
who were notPNAW98. One has to be cautious in interpreting too much 
into that given that this category includes those who were not working and 
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therefore will not have a profession in 1998. Finally, family background does 
matter: movers tend to have on average better educated fathers, reflected 
in fewer movers having illiterate fathers. Moreover, more movers tend to 
have fathers who were white collar workers than non-movers.
Table 2: Movers to Formal PNARW Jobs: 1998–2006
PNA98 & PNARW06 PNAW98 & PNARW06 notPNAW98 & 
PNARW06
Variable Movers All Movers All Movers All
Individual Characteristics
Male (%) 98.04 94.46 98.28 94.62 80.49 57.48
Age (in 1998)
Age in years 26.8 28.9 27.3 29.0 24.8 33.6
20–29 old % 78.43 61.93 75.86 61.91 86.18 36.92
30–39 old % 19.61 26.14 18.97 26.11 8.13 34.04
40–49 old % 1.96 10.65 5.17 10.77 5.69 27.23
Education %
None 7.84 22.73 6.90 22.48 1.63 31.65
Reads & writes 7.84 11.93 8.62 11.84 2.44 6.37
Less then 
intermediate
17.65 26.56 17.24 26.24 7.32 11.14
Intermediate 49.02 29.12 50.00 30.01 22.76 26.01
Higher than 
intermediate
3.92 3.84 5.17 3.90 8.13 4.83
University 13.73 5.82 12.07 5.52 57.72 20.01
Job Characteristics in 1998 
Job Region in 
1998 %
Greater Cairo 19.61 18.32 18.97 18.03 2.44 9.41
Alex.& Canal Cities 23.53 12.36 20.69 11.98 8.13 6.90
Lower Urban 11.76 17.19 10.34 16.69 3.25 11.74
Upper Urban 15.69 11.22 13.79 11.57 5.69 13.87
Lower Rural 5.88 11.79 12.07 12.65 7.32 13.54
Upper Rural 3.92 4.97 3.45 5.25 2.44 13.03
Tenure before 98 
(years)
8.25 13.31 8.91 13.34 4.33 15.15
continued u
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Occupation in 1998, %
Legislators, 
senior officials & 
managers
3.92 0.99 5.17 2.02 1.63 7.69




1.96 2.27 1.72 2.56 2.44 9.90




25.49 20.03 24.14 19.38 2.44 7.46
Skilled agricultural 
& fishery workers
5.88 1.70 6.90 2.56 8.13 16.47
Craft & related 
trades workers
29.41 43.47 29.31 42.80 4.88 6.68
Plant & machine 
operators and 
assemblers
15.69 19.89 17.24 19.25 4.88 2.85
Elementary 
occupations
5.88 6.96 5.17 7.00 1.63 1.49
Father’s characteristics %
Illiterate 33.33 59.09 32.76 59.08 23.58 54.16
White collar 31.37 19.18 32.76 19.52 47.97 25.21
Given the different nature and patterns of first jobs, Table 3 examines 
that group separately. Those are the characteristics of individuals aged 
between 18 and 45 years of age,4 whose first job started between 1998 and 
2006. We also distinguish between all first jobs and PNAW first jobs. 
Comparing the characteristics of those who have had formal PNARW 
first jobs, similar patterns are observed as in Table 2. A couple of interest-
ing differences are: first, those who managed to secure formal PNARW 
first jobs tend to be on average slightly older than those who haven’t, and 
37% of them tend to be located in Greater Cairo.
4  This age bracket seems to be reasonable to consider for first jobs. Including 15–18 years old distorts 
the results since those are least likely to have a formal job. Several sensitivity analyses were conducted 
using 20–45 and 18–40 age brackets and the results were robust.
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Table 3: Formal PNARW First Jobs in 2006
All First Jobs PNAW First Jobs Formal
PNARW06
% Jobs Started 2003–05 38.49 37.35 36.80
Individual Characteristics
Male % 70.59 76.50 77.19
Age (in years at time of LM entry) 22.15 21.94 23.23
Educational Levels %
None 8.08 1.72 0.35
Reads & writes 1.16 0.88 0.33
Less then intermediate 5.48 4.61 4.16
Intermediate
52.67 48.62 23.56
Higher than intermediate 5.50 6.30 7.22
University 27.12 37.87 64.39
Job Regions in 1998 %
Greater Cairo 18.86 30.63 37.14
Alex. & Canal Cities 9.92 13.19 16.65
Lower Urban 13.91 17.00 11.81
Upper Urban 13.53 17.76 25.02
Lower Rural 17.03 9.13 1.12
Upper Rural 15.97 3.17 1.55
Father’s characteristics %
White collar 26.04 30.94 49.12
Illiterate 41.25 34.22 19.24
Overall, the descriptive statistics suggest that the new labor law has had 
an impact on informal employment among those already employed but 
not among new entrants to the labor market. One potential explanation is 
that employers do not formalize the employment status of new workers 
who have just started their working careers. In the next sections, we 
explore the extent to which the findings so far can be attributed to the 
new labor law once the characteristics of individuals, jobs, and regions 
are controlled for. 
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5. Empirical Analysis: The Effect of the Labor Law
5.1 Probability of Formal Jobs and the Labor Law
First, to study the effect of the new labor law on job contract holding, 
the probability of workers moving to a formal (i.e. protected by job con-
tract) PNARW job is estimated distinguishing between before and after 
the new law. 
First, we model the probability of a worker having a formal PNARW 
job in 2006 not having one in 1998. Let the latent variable y* represent the 
decision to have a formal PNARW job. We do not observe the decision, 
only whether it is made or not.
€ 
yis
* = Xβ + ε  …………………… (1) 
Therefore, we define y = 1 if the worker has moved to a formal PNARW 
job and 0 otherwise.
€ 
yis =1 if y* > 0,
€ 
yis = 0 if y* ≤ 0
We assume that the disturbances are normally distributed with mean 
zero and unit variance and estimate the equation using probit function 
where X is a set of explanatory variables, β is a set of corresponding coef-
ficients and Φ (.) is the cumulative standard distribution.
 
€ 
P (yis =1 | Xβ) = Φ(Xβ)
The probability of a worker i originally in state s moving to a formal 
PNARW job in 2006 is estimated where s =1, 2, 3; 1= informal PNAW job 
in 1998; 2= informal PNA job in 1998; 3= notPNAW in 1998 (no restric-
tion on contract in 1998 is imposed). This group, s=3, includes those who 
were not working in 1998, i.e. students, housewives, unemployed but not 
retired or disabled persons, agricultural workers, non-waged workers 
(self-employed and employers) and public sector work as long as those 
individuals were working in 2006 and were not originally PNAW work-
ers in 1998. 
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To examine the effect of the new labor law a dummy for 2003–05 is 
used since the law was introduced in July 2003.5 The public sector has 
played a major role in the Egyptian labor market since the 1950s with 
the guaranteed civil-service employment for graduates of secondary and 
higher educational institutions. Since 1991, the Egyptian government 
embarked on various economic reforms and downsizing the public sector 
was one of them. According to Assaad (2007) employment in state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) started to decline in the 1988–98 decade, but employ-
ment in government was still growing rapidly during that period at about 
twice the rate of the growth of overall employment. This has changed 
in 1998–2006 when employment growth in the civil service has slowed 
dramatically. The public sector has been the preferred sector of employ-
ment for many new entrants to the labor market, particularly women. 
Although the government has slowed down its hiring, it is still the case 
that the public sector plays a major role in individuals’ choices. To capture 
this, we use the growth in public sector employment, as a proportion of 
total employment, by governorate between1998–2006.6 For individuals 
who were working in 1998 (s =1,2) this is based on the governorate of work 
location in 1998. For s =3, this is based on the governorate of residence in 
1998 rather than work since this group includes individuals who were not 
working in 1998.
We also control for job characteristics by including years of tenure 
before 1998 to capture the length of work experience. Job occupation in 
1998 is also included, in particular whether the worker’s occupation was 
professional work in 1998. Given the regional variation, regional dummies 
are included for the six main regions in Egypt. For s=3, we control for the 
various “working status” in 1998 by including self employment, unpaid 
family work, and housewives as covariates. 
Individual characteristics are also captured using male dummy, three 
age groups: 20–29, 30–29, and 40–49 years old. We restrict our analysis to 
those aged 20–50 years of age in 1998. Also, educational level is controlled 
for using six dummies. Finally, we control for family background, we use 
father’s characteristics: if father is illiterate and if father was white collar 
worker when the individual was 15 years of age.
5 Jobs that started in 2006 were excluded since there are very few observations pertaining to 2006, 
the year of the survey. However, robustness checks were undertaken whereby including 2006 and the 
findings were unaltered. 
6 Source: Egypt Human Development Report, various issues.
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Tables A2–A5 present the marginal effects. First, the effect of the labor 
law on the probability of moving to formal PNARW job overall is positive 
and significant indicating that the new labor law has had a positive impact 
on formal employment. The predicted probability of moving from informal 
to formal PNARW has increased in 2003–05 relative to 1998–2002 as fig-
ure 9 shows. The predicted probability of an informal worker moving from 
PNAW employment into formal PNARW job increased from 9% to 46% 
after the law for a reference worker.7 The predicted probability of an unpro-
tected worker moving from PNA employment into protected PNARW job 
increased from 10% to 42% after the law for a reference worker. Finally, the 
predicted probability for a notPNAW in 1998 moving into formal PNARW 
job increased from 9% to 12% in 2003–05.8 
Figure 9: Predicted Probability of Formal PNARW Jobs
Moving on to the other determinants of moving to protected employ-
ment, a number of factors play a significant role. First, and foremost the 
growth of public sector employment has a negative impact on moving into 
formal PNARW jobs, suggesting that workers still ranked the public sector 
7 Reference person for PNA98–PNARW06 and PNAW98–PNARW06: male, 20–29 years of age, 
worked in Greater Cairo in 1998, father is not illiterate and is white collar worker.
8 Reference person for notPNAW98–PNARW06: male, 20–29 years of age, lives in urban areas, not 
self employed, not housewife, not unpaid family worker in 1998, father is not illiterate and is white 
collar worker.
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as their preferred employment: in governorates where the public sector grew, 
the likelihood of workers moving into the private formal sector was lower.
As for individual characteristics, males were more likely to move to 
formal job. Although there was a negative relationship between age and 
mobility into formal jobs, this relationship was only significant for those 
who originated in notPNAW. The effect of education was not very strong 
after controlling for the public sector. Professional workers were more 
likely to move to protected jobs relative to other occupations. Duration of 
job tenure prior to 1998 seems to reduce the likelihood of moving although 
was not always significant. For those who were notPNAW in 1998, house-
wives, unpaid family workers, self-employed workers, all tend to be less 
likely than waged workers to move into formal employment. Family back-
ground matters: an illiterate father or a non-white collar worker reduce the 
probability of transition into protected jobs.9
The Probability of Formal PNARW First Jobs
Given our interest in the effect of the labor law on new entrants to the 
labor market, we examine this by estimating a binary probit model of the 
probability of a new entrant between 1998 and 2006 having a formal (con-
tract) PNARW first job. 
We use the same controls used above with the exception of job char-
acteristics, which do not apply since those individuals were not working 
in 1998. To examine the effect of the new labor law a dummy for 2003–05 
is used, but also year dummies were used, but were not significant, and are 
thus not reported. To capture the effect of public sector employment, the 
governorate of residence of the individual in 1998 is used. We limit our 
analysis to those aged 18–45 at the time of the first job, and use age in years 
at the time of first entry to the labor market.
As Table A6 shows, the labor law has had no significant impact for secur-
ing protected first jobs. In fact, the predicted probability of a formal private 
non-agricultural regular waged first job was around 30% before and after 
2003. There is also evidence of the importance of the growth of public 
sector employment which has a negative impact on workers getting for-
mal PNARW first jobs as found above. As for individual characteristics, 
9 Father’s education and occupation tend to be correlated. In addition, father’s education is som -
times correlated to the worker’s education level. Hence the tables provide various experiments to show 
the potential influence of those covariates.
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there is a negative relationship between age and getting a formal first job in 
PNARW sector. The effect of education is stronger here, with the educated 
being more likely to secure a protected first job relative to the uneducated. 
This is consistent with section 4, where the descriptive statistics 
revealed that the labor law did not really affect employment of new 
entrants to the labor market. To analyze the effect of the labor law further, 
the next sub-section studies the hazard rates into formal jobs before and 
after the law came into effect.
5.2 Hazard Rates into PNARW
This sub-section examines the impact of the new labor law on the haz-
ard rates of exits into formal PNARW employment. The hazard function 
is the product of two probabilities: the probability of receiving a job offer 
and the probability of accepting the job offer. We estimate a reduced form 
model where the total effects of the variables on exiting into protected 
PNARW employment is estimated rather than their separate effects on 
the two probabilities.10 
Given the nature of the data, durations are grouped into a discrete time 
interval (years). We measure the duration from 1998 till the time of exit or 
till 2006 which is the time of the survey (right censored). So, we estimate 
the probability of exiting to protected PNARW employment in a discrete 
time framework. In addition, we take account of unobserved heterogene-
ity. Based on Jenkins (2004), we estimate by maximum likelihood a discrete 
time (grouped duration data) proportional hazards regression model: (1) 
the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) model; and (2) the Prentice-Gloeckler (1978) 
model incorporating a gamma mixture distribution to summarize unob-
served individual heterogeneity, as proposed by Meyer (1990). We chose 
a piece-wise specification to capture the effect of the labor law. We’ve also 
experimented with non-parametric specification using year dummies. For 
further details on the PGH models, see Jenkins (2004).
In model 1, the discrete time hazard rate for person i in the time inter-
val j to exit to a formal PNARW employment can be written as:
€ 
hj X i j( ) =1− exp −exp X i j 'β + θ t( )[ ]{ }……………………. (2)
10  Jenkins (2004).
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where Xij is a set of covariates, β are the coefficients to be estimated, 
and θ(t) is the functional form of how the duration of the spell affects the 
hazard rate. 
Model 2 incorporates a Gamma distributed random variable to describe 
unobserved (or omitted) heterogeneity between individuals. The discrete-
time hazard function is:
€ 








The same covariates used before are included. To capture the effect of 
the new labor law, we use a dummy for 2003–05. The piece-wise constant 
baseline hazard specification is therefore the preferred specification for the 
baseline hazard estimated in this study. As before, we estimate exit from 
three different states: 1. the hazard rate for exit from informal PNAW to 
formal PNARW; 2. the hazard rate for exit from informal PNA to formal 
PNARW; 3. the hazard rate for exit from notPNAW to formal PNARW. 
Model 2 with unobserved individual heterogeneity (frailty) was never 
significant, and therefore the results from model 1 only are reported 
below in TablesA6–A8. The figures reported are the estimated coeffi-
cients.11 First, examining the effect of the new labor law on exits to formal 
PNARW employment, the evidence suggests a positive significant impact 
for exits from PNAW, PNA, and notPNAW. Although for exits from not-
PNAW, the effect is weaker once a full set of controls are used. As Table 4 
shows, the hazard rate increased from around 3% to 14% for PNAW98–
PNARW06. However, for notPNAW98–PNARW06, the increase was 
small: from only 1.7% to 3%, albeit the evidence suggests that the new 
labor law has had a positive and significant impact on the hazard rate of 
exiting into formal PNARW jobs.
In addition, the public sector plays an important role in exits to formal 
PNARW jobs, suggesting that to a large degree public sector employment 
dominates private sector ones. In fact, the findings strongly indicate that 
11 Note that the proportionate impact of each variable on the state-specific hazard rate can be 
calculated by taking the exponent of the coefficient.
28
those institutional factors related to the labor law and the public sector 
tend to be more important than individual characteristics of workers. 
Finally for new entrants, we estimate the hazard rate for a new entrant 
to the labor market exiting to protected PNARW job. To capture the 
effect of the new labor law, we use a dummy for 2003–05 and thus adopt a 
piece-wise constant baseline hazard specification. A number of individual, 
family, and regional controls are used as before. 
As Table A9 shows, the new labor law has had no significant impact on 
formal PNARW first jobs. The hazard rate was 6.2% before the law and 
5.8% after, but that difference was insignificant. However, as was evident 
before, the public sector plays a significant role in affecting the hazard rate 
of exits to formal PNARW first jobs. 







First Job:  
PNARW06
2003–2005 14.04 13.97 3.27 5.77*
1998–2002 3.19 3.64 1.68 6.16*
Notes: For a reference person. *Not statistically significant.
6. Conclusion 
The introduction of the new labor law in 2003 provides us with an 
excellent opportunity to study the impact of more flexible employment 
protection regulations on employment. In particular, this paper examines 
the effect of the new labor law on formal jobs (i.e. those with contracts) 
in the private non-agricultural regular waged sector. The findings suggest 
that the new law has had a positive impact on those who were employed in 
1998 in the private non-agricultural sector and in the private non-agricul-
tural waged sector. However, the law has had no significant impact for the 
new entrants to the labor market. A possible explanation is that employ-
ers do not formalize the employment status of new entrants to the labor 
market. Another important finding is that the growth of public sector 
employment is an important determinant of mobility into formal private 
non-agricultural regular waged work. Workers in governorates with high 
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public sector employment growth are less likely to move into formal pri-
vate non-agriculture waged employment.
The findings are encouraging: labor flexibility increases formal 
employment. This should encourage further reforms pertaining to the 
labor market to increase flexibility in the labor market such as reducing 
the social security contribution by employers and workers to attempt to 
reduce informalization and achieve decent employment. However, policy-
makers must recognize that labor regulation is only one part of the broader 
economic policy framework. Its interaction with the regulation of product 
markets, macroeconomic policy, and the business investment climate will 
determine the overall labor market performance.
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Appendix
Table A1: Moves Before and After 2003 
PNAW98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 94.67 5.33 100
93.46 66.29 91.47
2003–2005 70.96 29.04 100
6.54 33.71 8.53
Total 92.65 7.35 100
100 100 100
PNA98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 94.14 5.87 100
92.31 64.78 90.07
2003–2005 71.13 28.87 100
7.69 35.22 9.93
Total 91.86 8.14 100
100 100 100
notPNAW98 to PNARW06 (%)
Year (%) No Yes Total
1998–2002 97.32 2.68 100
90.6 67.38 89.77
2003–2005 88.62 11.38 100
9.4 32.62 10.23
Total 96.43 3.57 100
100 100 100
Notes: In each entry, the first figure is the % of the row; the second figure in italics is the % in the 
given column.
PNAW98: private non-agriculture waged employment in 1998; PNA98: private non-agriculture 
employment in 1998; notPNAW98: not private non-agriculture waged in 1998; PNARW06: private 
non-agriculture regular waged in 2006.
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Table A2: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects













2003–2005 dummy 0.237 0.242 0.236 0.268 0.281 0.267
(5.53)** (5.60)** (5.56)** (5.65)** (5.77)** (5.67)**
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008
(2.47)* (2.38)* (2.31)* (2.32)* (2.29)* (2.18)*
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.040 0.045 0.039
(1.53) (2.38)* (1.60)
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years -0.001 -0.010 -0.004 0.002 -0.018 -0.002
(0.06) (0.46) (0.19) (0.08) (0.95) (0.07)
40–49 years -0.022 -0.026 -0.022 -0.016 -0.036 -0.018
(0.52) (0.68) (0.57) (0.33) (1.20) (0.39)
Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.006 -0.005 -0.011
(0.20) (0.19) (0.37) (0.19) (0.16) (0.36)
Less than interm. -0.013 -0.011 -0.020 -0.014 -0.007 -0.021
(0.52) (0.45) (0.86) (0.53) (0.26) (0.85)
Intermediate 0.007 0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.017 -0.006
(0.26) (0.28) (0.07) (0.07) (0.61) (0.23)
Higher than interm. -0.010 -0.011 -0.018 -0.013 0.002 -0.020
(0.25) (0.27) (0.48) (0.30) (0.05) (0.50)
University 0.017 -0.024 0.001 0.026 0.003 0.009
(0.45) (0.73) (0.03) (0.60) (0.09) (0.25)
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.87) (0.59) (0.70) (0.97) (0.63) (0.79)
Professional in ‘98 0.220 0.161
(2.30)* (1.97)*
Job Region in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex & Canal Cities 0.035 0.044 0.035 0.046 0.052 0.045
(1.31) (1.58) (1.38) (1.51) (1.65) (1.54)
continued u
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Lower Urban 0.012 0.020 0.013 0.017 0.023 0.018
(0.36) (0.58) (0.40) (0.47) (0.59) (0.49)
Upper Urban 0.027 0.034 0.033 0.031 0.036 0.037
(0.93) (1.14) (1.14) (0.96) (1.06) (1.14)
Lower Rural 0.001 0.008 0.007 0.001 0.005 0.007
(0.03) (0.21) (0.18) (0.03) (0.12) (0.16)
Upper Rural 0.048 0.056 0.060 0.054 0.058 0.066
(0.90) (1.02) (1.09) (0.93) (0.97) (1.12)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.052 0.045 0.033 0.043 0.041 0.025
(2.44)* (2.22)* (1.67) (1.97)* (1.83) (1.20)
Illiterate -0.041 -0.044
(2.23)* (2.14)*
No of Obs. 570 570 570 533 533 533
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table A3: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
PNA in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
All All All Males Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2003–2005 dummy 0.212 0.215 0.208 0.239 0.249 0.235
(5.39)** (5.47)** (5.39)** (5.54)** (5.65)** (5.55)**
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008
(2.61)** (2.53)* (2.53)* (2.48)* (2.47)* (2.41)*
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.047 0.051 0.045
(1.69) (2.53)* (1.76)
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years 0.005 -0.005 0.002 0.010 -0.016 0.006
(0.20) (0.20) (0.07) (0.36) (0.83) (0.21)
40–49 years 0.000 -0.007 -0.005 0.012 -0.026 0.004
(0.00) (0.16) (0.12) (0.21) (0.82) (0.07)
continued u
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Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.011 0.011 0.004
(0.32) (0.31) (0.12) (0.30) (0.31) (0.12)
Less than interm. -0.009 -0.007 -0.017 -0.010 -0.001 -0.019
(0.30) (0.25) (0.66) (0.33) (0.04) (0.68)
Intermediate 0.022 0.022 0.010 0.018 0.039 0.006
(0.73) (0.74) (0.36) (0.54) (1.21) (0.20)
Higher than interm. 0.025 0.025 0.008 0.024 0.061 0.008
(0.48) (0.48) (0.18) (0.43) (0.98) (0.16)
University 0.032 -0.018 0.011 0.042 0.022 0.021
(0.73) (0.48) (0.30) (0.85) (0.46) (0.48)
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(1.07) (0.80) (0.91) (1.19) (1.02)
Professional in ‘98 0.213 0.159
(2.22)* (1.91)
Job Regions in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex. & Canal Cities 0.028 0.036 0.028 0.037 0.042 0.035
(1.01) (1.26) (1.04) (1.17) (1.29) (1.18)
Lower Urban 0.008 0.015 0.009 0.013 0.017 0.014
(0.24) (0.43) (0.28) (0.35) (0.45) (0.38)
Upper Urban 0.013 0.019 0.020 0.016 0.020 0.023
(0.45) (0.64) (0.68) (0.51) (0.59) (0.71)
Lower Rural 0.044 0.051 0.050 0.050 0.055 0.057
(1.18) (1.36) (1.31) (1.22) (1.30) (1.34)
Upper Rural 0.030 0.034 0.039 0.034 0.032 0.044
(0.56) (0.64) (0.72) (0.59) (0.56) (0.75)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.059 0.053 0.040 0.051 0.050 0.032
(2.66)** (2.47)* (1.90) (2.23)* (2.12)* (1.47)
Illiterate -0.042 -0.045
(2.27)* (2.21)*
No of Obs. 603 603 603 565 565 565
Notes: Robust t-statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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Table A4: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
All All All All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.004
(2.50)* (2.43)* (1.40) (1.45)
Public Jobs -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(5.00)** (4.89)** (4.41)** (3.23)**
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(1.96) )* (1.99)* (1.88) (1.94)*
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years -0.018 -0.017 -0.011 -0.011
(6.06)** (6.08)** (4.07)** (4.04)**
40–49 years -0.012 -0.012 -0.005 -0.004
(5.21)** (5.23)** (1.84) (1.33)
Educational Levels (ref.: None)
Reads & writes 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.45) (0.43) (0.50)
Less than interm. 0.013 0.011 0.010
(1.36) (1.20) (1.20)
Intermediate 0.012 0.009 0.008
(1.62) (1.31) (1.31)
Higher than interm. 0.023 0.018 0.018 0.003
(1.91) (1.63) (1.84) (0.71)
University 0.029 0.023 0.029 0.004
(3.03)** (2.57)* (3.35)** (1.97)*
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.0004 -0.0004
(2.66)** (3.01)**
Professional in ‘98 -0.010
(5.21)**
Self employed in ‘98 -0.005
(1.55)




Housewife in ‘98 -0.006
(1.63)
Urban -0.006 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(2.23)* (2.14)* (1.72) (1.70)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.005
(1.81) (1.18) (1.72) (2.29) *
Illiterate -0.004
(1.73)
No. of Obs. 3880 3880 3880 3880
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table A5: Probability of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006: Males 
Males Males Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy 0.012 0.009 0.010 0.010
(2.20)* (1.77) (2.11)* (1.54)
Public Jobs -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(4.05)** (3.71)** (3.96)** (3.44)**
Individual Characteristics
Age
30–39 years -0.014 -0.013 -0.014 -0.012
(3.36)** (3.11)** (3.39)** (3.13)**
40–49 years -0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003
(0.24) (0.53) (0.36) (0.66)
Educational Levels (ref.: None)
Reads & writes 0.013
(0.67)
Less than interm. 0.007 0.008 0.011
(0.67) (0.80) (0.81)




Higher than interm. 0.008 0.017 0.011 0.004
(0.74) (1.34) (0.79) (0.78)
University 0.015 0.032 0.016 0.013
(1.53) (2.79)** (1.31) (3.49)**
Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(2.95)** (2.55)* (2.87)** (2.46)**
Professional in ‘98 -0.013 -0.011
(4.36)** (4.18)**
Self employed in ‘98 -0.007
(1.73)
Unpaid worker in ‘98 0.0001
(0.04)
Urban -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004
(1.59) (1.31) (1.44) (1.30)
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.004
(1.98)* (1.89) (1.34) (1.43)
Illiterate -0.007 -0.007
(1.99)* (2.09)*
No. of Obs. 2709 2709 2709 2709
Notes: Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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Table A6: Probability of First Job with Contract in 2006: Marginal Effects
(PNARW in 2006)
All All Males Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2003–2005 dummy -0.011 -0.011 -0.017 -0.017
(0.96) (0.98) (1.16) (1.17)
Public Jobs -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007




Age 0.003 0.003 0.013 0.012
(2.25)* (2.08)* (4.70)** (4.66)**
Educational Levels (ref. None)
Reads & writes 0.158 0.140
(1.09) (1.03)
Less than interm. 0.272 0.245 0.079 0.074
(2.32)* (2.17)* (0.75) (0.71)
Intermediate 0.118 0.105 0.023 0.022
(1.89) (1.71) (0.33) (0.30)
Higher than interm. 0.348 0.294 0.098 0.093
(2.73)** (2.43)* (0.94) (0.90)
University 0.357 0.307 0.113 0.108
(3.60)** (3.21)** (1.28) (1.22)
Job Region (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex. & Canal Cities 0.008 0.009 0.016 0.016
(0.51) (0.55) (0.74) (0.72)
Lower Urban -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.000
(0.22) (0.18) (0.01) (0.00)
Upper Urban 0.021 0.021 0.045 0.045
(1.19) (1.20) (2.02)* (2.02)*
Lower Rural -0.076 -0.073 -0.091 -0.091
(3.73)** (3.63)** (2.82)** (2.81)**
Upper Rural -0.076 -0.073 -0.068 -0.068








No. of Obs. 1666 1666 1145 1145
Notes. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Table A7: Hazard Rate of Holding a Job Contract in 2006: Males
PNAW98 - PNAW06 PNA98 - PNAW06
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 
dummy 1.839 5.49 1.859 5.5 1.715 5.4 1.715 5.36
Public Jobs -0.169 -2.14 -0.174 -2.16 -0.146 -2.19 -0.148 -2.16
Individual Characteristics
Age (ref: 20–29 years)
30–39 years 0.111 0.2 -0.043 -0.08 0.211 0.41 0.099 0.19
40–49 years -15.813 -0.01 -15.984 -0.01 -0.658 -0.52 -0.914 -0.72
Educational Level (ref: none)
Reads and 
writes 0.191 0.23 -0.025 -0.03 0.621 0.81 0.429 0.55
Less than 
interm.  -0.143 -0.2 -0.312 -0.42 0.129 0.18 -0.086 -0.12
Intermediate 0.165 0.23 0.009 0.01 0.559 0.8 0.364 0.51
Higher than 
interm. -0.182 -0.17 -0.372 -0.35 0.562 0.6 0.317 0.33
University 0.407 0.47 0.222 0.25 0.733 0.87 0.522 0.61
Job Region in 1998 (ref: Greater Cairo)
Alex & Canal 
Cities 0.788 1.78 0.902 2.02 0.663 1.55 0.745 1.73
Lower Urban 0.411 0.62 0.557 0.81 0.199 0.32 0.297 0.47
Upper Urban 0.607 1.18 0.772 1.46 0.297 0.61 0.451 0.91
Lower Rural 0.321 0.39 0.519 0.63 0.805 1.35 0.921 1.53
Upper Rural -0.323 -0.3 0.030 0.03 -0.495 -0.46 -0.249 -0.23
continued u
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Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before 
‘98 -0.042 -1.00 -0.030 -0.72 -0.046 -1.13 -0.037 -0.91
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.693 1.83 0.461 1.16 0.700 2.04 0.460 1.28
Illiterate -0.816 -2.20 -0.755 -2.17
Constant -8.109 -4.54 -7.827 -4.29 -7.912 -5.14 -7.492 -4.78
person-years 4091 4091 4326 4326
Log 
Likelihood -194.69 -192.17 -220.30 -217.87
Table A8: Hazard Rate of Holding a Job Contract in 2006 
notPNAW in 1998 and PNARW in 2006
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 dummy 0.410 1.68 0.191 0.78 0.459 1.71 0.270 1.00
Public Jobs -0.129 -4.35 -0.122 -3.98 -0.127 -3.83 -0.122 -3.58
Individual Characteristics
Male 0.587 2.18 0.401 1.46
Age
30–39 years -1.859 -3.32 -1.771 -3.07 -1.530 -2.33 -1.499 -2.24
40–49 years -0.423 -0.64 -0.658 -0.93 0.408 0.5 0.006 0.01
Educational Levels 
Read & write 1.058 0.75 0.770 0.54
Less than interm. 1.252 1.13 0.985 0.88
Intermediate 1.258 1.21 1.070 1.01
Higher than 
interm. 1.520 1.41 1.481 1.34 0.321 0.72 0.458 1.02
University 1.790 1.74 1.861 1.73 0.547 1.86 0.816 2.6
Urban -0.791 -2.47 -0.685 -2.11 -0.711 -2.11 -0.618 -1.82
continued u
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Job characteristics in 1998
Tenure before ‘98 -0.104 -3.61 -0.078 -2.64 -0.128 -3.59 -0.096 -2.8
Professional ‘98 -2.225 -4.26 -1.861 -3.54
Self employed ‘98 -0.896 -1.49 -0.787 -1.3
Unpaid ‘98 -0.049 -0.11 -0.077 -0.16
Housewife ‘98 -1.180 -1.12
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.403 1.84 0.293 1.28 0.469 1.94 0.329 1.31
Illiterate -0.396 -1.33 -0.527 -1.57
Constant -7.953 -6.45 -7.318 -5.68 -6.215 -7.53 -5.982 -7.11
person-year 30547 30547 21272 21272
Log likelihood         -524.12 -504.583 -418.674 -406.262
Table A9: Hazard Rate of First Job with Contract in 2006
(PNARW in 2006)
All Males
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat
2003–2005 
dummy -0.150 -1.04 -0.142 -0.99 -0.164 -0.96 -0.161 -0.94
Public Jobs -0.081 -2.65 -0.080 -2.64 -0.069 -2.05 -0.069 -2.05
Individual Characteristics
Male -0.008 -0.05 -0.011 -0.07
Age -0.139 -5.96 -0.137 -5.9 -0.078 -2.45 -0.078 -2.44
Education 
Less than interm 1.538 1.97 1.646 2.12
Intermediate 1.018 1.37 1.127 1.52
Higher than 
interm 1.539 2.00 1.665 2.17 0.450 1.37 0.458 1.40
University 1.735 2.36 1.881 2.58 0.556 2.66 0.570 2.75
continued u
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Job Region in 98 (ref. Greater Cairo)
Alex., Canal 
Cities 0.025 0.13 0.034 0.18 0.083 0.37 0.087 0.39
Lower Urban -0.153 -0.57 -0.155 -0.57 -0.161 -0.51 -0.159 -0.5
Upper Urban 0.160 0.8 0.153 0.77 0.322 1.44 0.322 1.44
Lower Rural -1.970 -3.25 -2.014 -3.32 -2.775 -2.71 -2.788 -2.73
Upper Rural -1.809 -2.98 -1.859 -3.07 -1.371 -2.24 -1.384 -2.26
Father’s characteristics
White collar 0.171 1.12 0.235 1.6 0.110 0.62 0.132 0.77
Illiterate -0.291 -1.48 -0.094 -0.43
Constant -2.694 -2.35 -2.945 -2.61 -2.820 -2.84 -2.876 -2.93
person-year 7102 7102 3811 3811
Log likelihood           -821.448 -822.594 -597.764 -597.859
